

# 24

## DIALOGUE AND CONVERSATIONAL AGENTS

- C: I want you to tell me the names of the fellows on the St. Louis team.  
A: I'm telling you. Who's on first, What's on second, I Don't Know is on third.  
C: You know the fellows' names?  
A: Yes.  
C: Well, then, who's playing first?  
A: Yes.  
C: I mean the fellow's name on first.  
A: Who.  
C: The guy on first base.  
A: Who is on first.  
C: Well what are you askin' *me* for?  
A: I'm not asking you – I'm telling you. Who is on first.  
*Who's on First* – Bud Abbott and Lou Costello's version of an old burlesque standard.

The literature of the fantastic abounds in inanimate objects magically endowed with sentience and the gift of speech. From Ovid's statue of Pygmalion to Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, Cao Xue Qin's Divine Luminescent Stone-in-Waiting to Snow White's mirror, there is something deeply touching about creating something and then having a chat with it. Legend has it that after finishing his sculpture of *Moses*, Michelangelo thought it so lifelike that he tapped it on the knee and commanded it to speak. Perhaps this shouldn't be surprising. Language itself has always been the mark of humanity and sentience, and **conversation** or **dialogue** is the most fundamental and specially privileged arena of language. It is certainly the first kind of language we learn as children, and for most of us, it is the kind of language we most commonly indulge in, whether we are ordering curry for lunch or buying spinach, participating in business meetings or talking with our families, booking airline flights or complaining about the weather.

This chapter introduces the fundamental structures and algorithms in **conversational agents**. Conversational agents most often communicate via speech rather than

text, and so they are also known as **spoken dialogue systems**, or **spoken language systems**. These programs communicate with users in spoken natural language in order to make travel arrangements, answer questions about weather or sports, route telephone calls, act as a general telephone assistant, or perform even more sophisticated tasks.

Many of these tasks involve telephony, and also involve mobile situations where a large screen and keyboard may not be available (Cohen and Oviatt, 1994). Applications relating to the domain of travel are thus very common. Indeed travel planning and management has been a key concern of dialogue systems since the early influential GUS system for planning airline travel (Bobrow et al., 1977). More recently, a number of spoken language systems for booking airline flights were built under the Air Traffic Information System (ATIS) (Hemphill et al., 1990) and Communicator (Walker, 2001) programs. We will use this travel domain as an example throughout the chapter (as we used it to discuss grammar rules for parsing ATIS sentences in Ch. 12). Fig. 24.1 shows a sample dialogue from a Communicator system, taken from Xu and Rudnicky (2000).

S1:	Hello. You've reached the [Communicator]. Tell me your full name
U2:	<i>hi i'd like to fly to seattle tuesday morning</i>
S3:	Traveling to Seattle on Tuesday, August eleventh in the morning. Your full name?
U4:	<i>[John Doe]</i>
S5:	Hello, [John], I'm glad to hear from you again. You can now ask me for help.
S6:	OK. Let's see I have a United flight departing Pittsburgh at ten forty five a.m. arriving into Seattle at one fifty seven p.m. Is that OK?
U7:	<i>Yes</i>
S8:	Will you return to Pittsburgh from Seattle?
U9:	<i>no i will go to Los Angeles</i>
S10:	Traveling to Los Angeles. on what date
U11:	<i>Sorry can we go back to talk about the previous leg again</i>
S12:	For the first leg, you are on a United flight 1446 departing Pittsburgh at ten forty five A.M. tomorrow, arriving in Seattle at one fifty seven P.M. Do you want to take that?
U13:	<i>actually i want to leave on wednesday</i>
S14:	a flight on wednesday.
S15:	I have a flight departing Pittsburgh at ten forty five a.m., arrives Seattle at one fifty seven p.m. Is that OK?
U16:	<i>Yes</i>

**Figure 24.1** The travel domain: a fragment from a successful conversation between a user (U) and the Communicator system (S) of Xu and Rudnicky (2000).

Another promising domain is automatic call routing. A call routing system directs incoming calls in a telephone call center, transferring the call to the appropriate human. Call routing dialogue systems generally begin by asking the user open-ended questions like *How may I help you?* (Gorin et al., 1997), or *How may I direct your call?* (Chu-Carroll and Carpenter, 1999). Fig. 24.2 shows sample conversations from the AT&T How May I Help You (HMIHY) system (Gorin et al., 1997).

A somewhat different domain, which is very far from the telephony area, is automatic tutoring systems. Fig. 24.3 shows part of a dialogue from the ITSPOKE dialogue system (Litman and Silliman, 2004), which uses the Why2-Atlas text-based tutoring

S:	How may I help you?
U:	<i>can you tell me how much it is to tokyo?</i>
S:	You want to know the cost of a call?
U:	<i>yes that's right</i>
S:	Please hold on for rate information.
S:	How may I help you?
U:	<i>what's the area code for chicago?</i>
S:	You want an area code.
U:	<i>(silence)</i>
S:	The area code for Chicago is 312.

**Figure 24.2** The call routing domain: two conversations between a user (U) and the AT&T How May I Help You (HMIHY) system (S) (Gorin et al., 1997).

system as its tutoring backend (VanLehn et al., 2002).

S:	I didn't understand. What force acts on all objects within close proximity to earth?
U:	<i>uh the force of gravity</i>
S:	Fine. Besides the Earth's gravitational force, are there any other forces acting on the person, keys, and elevator after the release?
U:	<i>no</i>
S:	Yep. Thus, keep in mind that after the release, the only force on the person, keys, and elevator is the force of gravity. If gravity is the only force acting on an object, will it be moving or staying still?
U:	<i>it will be moving</i>
S:	Fine. Not only are the person, keys, and elevator moving, they have only gravitational forces on them. When an object is falling and has only gravitational force on it, it is said to be in what?
U:	<i>freefall</i>

**Figure 24.3** The tutoring domain: part of an conversation between a student user (U) and the ITSPOKE system (S) of Litman and Silliman (2004).

Sec. 24.1 starts out with a summary of facts about human conversation, including the idea of turns and utterances, speech acts, grounding, dialogue structure, and conversational implicature. The next few sections introduce the components of spoken language systems and some evaluation metrics. We then turn in Sec. 24.5 and Sec. 24.6 to the more sophisticated information-state and Markov decision processes models of conversational agents, and we conclude with some advanced topics like the BDI (belief-desire-intention) paradigm.

## 24.1 PROPERTIES OF HUMAN CONVERSATIONS

Conversation between humans is an intricate and complex joint activity. Because of the limitations of our current technologies, conversations between humans and machines are vastly simpler and more constrained than these human conversations. Nonethe-

less, before we attempt to design a conversational agent to converse with humans, it is crucial to understand something about how humans converse with each other.

In this section we discuss some properties of human-human conversation that distinguish it from the kinds of (text-based) discourses we have seen so far. The main difference is that conversation is a kind of **joint activity** between two (or more) interlocutors. This basic fact has a number of ramifications; conversations are built up out of consecutive **turns**, each turn consists of **joint action** of the speaker and hearer, and the hearer make special inferences called **conversational implicatures** about the speaker's intended meaning.

### 24.1.1 Turns and Turn-Taking

#### TURN-TAKING

Dialogue is characterized by **turn-taking**; Speaker A says something, then speaker B, then speaker A, and so on. If having a turn (or “taking the floor”) is a resource to be allocated, what is the process by which turns are allocated? How do speakers know when it is the proper time to contribute their turn?

It turns out that conversation and language itself are structured in such a way as to deal efficiently with this resource allocation problem. One source of evidence for this is the timing of the utterances in normal human conversations. While speakers can overlap each other while talking, it turns out that on average the total amount of overlap is remarkably small; perhaps less than 5% (Levinson, 1983). If speakers aren't overlapping, do they figure out when to talk by waiting for a pause after the other speaker finishes? This is also very rare. The amount of time between turns is quite small, generally less than a few hundred milliseconds even in multi-party discourse. Since it may take more than this few hundred milliseconds for the next speaker to plan the motor routines for producing their utterance, this means that speakers begin motor planning for their next utterance before the previous speaker has finished. For this to be possible, natural conversation must be set up in such a way that (most of the time) people can quickly figure out **who** should talk next, and exactly **when** they should talk. This kind of turn-taking behavior is generally studied in the field of **Conversation Analysis (CA)**. In a key conversation-analytic paper, Sacks et al. (1974) argued that turn-taking behavior, at least in American English, is governed by a set of turn-taking rules. These rules apply at a **transition-relevance place**, or **TRP**; places where the structure of the language allows speaker shift to occur. Here is a version of the turn-taking rules simplified from Sacks et al. (1974):

#### CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

(24.1) **Turn-taking Rule.** At each TRP of each turn:

- a. If during this turn the current speaker has selected A as the next speaker then A must speak next.
- b. If the current speaker does not select the next speaker, any other speaker may take the next turn.
- c. If no one else takes the next turn, the current speaker may take the next turn.

There are a number of important implications of rule (24.1) for dialogue modeling. First, subrule (24.1a) implies that there are some utterances by which the speaker specifically selects who the next speaker will be. The most obvious of these are questions, in which the speaker selects another speaker to answer the question. Two-part

## ADJACENCY PAIRS

## DIALOGIC PAIR

structures like QUESTION-ANSWER are called **adjacency pairs** (Schegloff, 1968) or **dialogic pair** (Harris, 2005). Other adjacency pairs include GREETING followed by GREETING, COMPLIMENT followed by DOWNPLAYER, REQUEST followed by GRANT. We will see that these pairs and the dialogue expectations they set up will play an important role in dialogue modeling.

## SIGNIFICANT SILENCE

Subrule (24.1a) also has an implication for the interpretation of silence. While silence can occur after any turn, silence in between the two parts of an adjacency pair is **significant silence**. For example Levinson (1983) notes this example from Atkinson and Drew (1979); pause lengths are marked in parentheses (in seconds):

- (24.2) A: Is there something bothering you or not?  
(1.0)  
A: Yes or no?  
(1.5)  
A: Eh?  
B: No.

## DISPREFERRED

Since A has just asked B a question, the silence is interpreted as a refusal to respond, or perhaps a **dispreferred** response (a response, like saying “no” to a request, which is stigmatized). By contrast, silence in other places, for example a lapse after a speaker finishes a turn, is not generally interpretable in this way. These facts are relevant for user interface design in spoken dialogue systems; users are disturbed by the pauses in dialogue systems caused by slow speech recognizers (Yankelovich et al., 1995).

## UTTERANCE

Another implication of (24.1) is that transitions between speakers don’t occur just anywhere; the **transition-relevance places** where they tend to occur are generally at **utterance** boundaries. Recall from Ch. 12 that spoken utterances differ from written sentences in a number of ways. They tend to be shorter, are more likely to be single clauses or even just single words, the subjects are usually pronouns rather than full lexical noun phrases, and they include filled pauses and repairs. A hearer must take all this (and other cues like prosody) into account to know where to begin talking.

## 24.1.2 Language as Action: Speech Acts

The previous section showed that conversation consists of a sequence of turns, each of which consists of one or more utterance. A key insight into conversation due to Wittgenstein (1953) but worked out more fully by Austin (1962) is that an utterance in a dialogue is a kind of **action** being performed by the speaker.

## PERFORMATIVE

The idea that an utterance is a kind of action is particularly clear in **performative** sentences like the following:

- (24.3) I name this ship the *Titanic*.  
(24.4) I second that motion.  
(24.5) I bet you five dollars it will snow tomorrow.

When uttered by the proper authority, for example, (24.3) has the effect of changing the state of the world (causing the ship to have the name *Titanic*) just as any action can change the state of the world. Verbs like *name* or *second* which perform this kind of action are called performative verbs, and Austin called these kinds of actions **speech**

## SPEECH ACTS

**acts.** What makes Austin's work so far-reaching is that speech acts are not confined to this small class of performative verbs. Austin's claim is that the utterance of any sentence in a real speech situation constitutes three kinds of acts:

- **locutionary act:** the utterance of a sentence with a particular meaning.
- **illocutionary act:** the act of asking, answering, promising, etc., in uttering a sentence.
- **perlocutionary act:** the (often intentional) production of certain effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the addressee in uttering a sentence.

## ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

For example, Austin explains that the utterance of example (24.6) might have the **illocutionary force** of protesting and the perlocutionary effect of stopping the addressee from doing something, or annoying the addressee.

(24.6)

You can't do that.

The term **speech act** is generally used to describe illocutionary acts rather than either of the other two types of acts. Searle (1975b), in modifying a taxonomy of Austin's, suggests that all speech acts can be classified into one of five major classes:

- **Assertives:** committing the speaker to something's being the case (*suggesting, putting forward, swearing, boasting, concluding*).
- **Directives:** attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something (*asking, ordering, requesting, inviting, advising, begging*).
- **Commissives:** committing the speaker to some future course of action (*promising, planning, vowing, betting, opposing*).
- **Expressives:** expressing the psychological state of the speaker about a state of affairs (*thanking, apologizing, welcoming, deploring*).
- **Declarations:** bringing about a different state of the world via the utterance (including many of the performative examples above; *I resign, You're fired*.)

### 24.1.3 Language as Joint Action: Grounding

## COMMON GROUND

## GROUND

The previous section suggested that each turn or utterance could be viewed as an action by a speaker. But dialogue is not a series of unrelated independent acts. Instead, dialogue is a collective act performed by the speaker and the hearer. One implication of joint action is that, unlike in monologue, the speaker and hearer must constantly establish **common ground** (Stalnaker, 1978), the set of things that are mutually believed by both speakers. The need to achieve common ground means that the hearer must **ground** the speaker's utterances, making it clear that the hearer has understood the speaker's meaning and intention.

As Clark (1996) points out, people need closure or grounding for non-linguistic actions as well. For example, why does a well-designed elevator button light up when it's pressed? Because this indicates to the would-be elevator traveler that she has successfully called the elevator. Clark phrases this need for closure as follows (after (Norman, 1988)):

**Principle of closure.** Agents performing an action require evidence, sufficient for current purposes, that they have succeeded in performing it.

Grounding is also important when the hearer needs to indicate that the speaker has *not* succeeded in performing an action. If the hearer has problems in understanding, she must indicate these problems to the speaker, again so that mutual understanding can eventually be achieved.

## CONTRIBUTION

How is closure achieved? Clark and Schaefer (1989) introduce the idea that each joint linguistic act or **contribution** has two phases, called **presentation** and **acceptance**. In the first phase, a speaker presents the hearer with an utterance, performing a sort of speech act. In the acceptance phase, the hearer has to ground the utterance, indicating to the speaker whether understanding was achieved.

What methods can the hearer (call her B) use to ground the speaker A's utterance? Clark and Schaefer (1989) discuss five main types of methods, ordered from weakest to strongest:

REFORMULATING  
COLLABORATIVE  
COMPLETION

1. **Continued attention:** B shows she is continuing to attend and therefore remains satisfied with A's presentation.
2. **Relevant next contribution:** B starts in on the next relevant contribution.
3. **Acknowledgement:** B nods or says a continuer like *uh-huh, yeah*, or the like, or an **assessment** like *that's great*.
4. **Demonstration:** B demonstrates all or part of what she has understood A to mean, for example by **reformulating** (paraphrasing) A's utterance, or by **collaborative completion** of A's utterance.
5. **Display:** B displays verbatim all or part of A's presentation.

Let's look for examples of these in a human-human dialogue example. We'll be returning to this example throughout the chapter; in order to design a more sophisticated machine dialogue agent, it helps to look at how a human agent performs similar tasks. Fig. 24.4 shows part of a dialogue between a human travel agent and a human client.

C <sub>1</sub> :	... I need to travel in May.
A <sub>1</sub> :	And, what day in May did you want to travel?
C <sub>2</sub> :	OK uh I need to be there for a meeting that's from the 12th to the 15th.
A <sub>2</sub> :	And you're flying into what city?
C <sub>3</sub> :	Seattle.
A <sub>3</sub> :	And what time would you like to leave Pittsburgh?
C <sub>4</sub> :	Uh hmm I don't think there's many options for non-stop.
A <sub>4</sub> :	Right. There's three non-stops today.
C <sub>5</sub> :	What are they?
A <sub>5</sub> :	The first one departs PGH at 10:00am arrives Seattle at 12:05 their time. The second flight departs PGH at 5:55pm, arrives Seattle at 8pm. And the last flight departs PGH at 8:15pm arrives Seattle at 10:28pm.
C <sub>6</sub> :	OK I'll take the 5ish flight on the night before on the 11th.
A <sub>6</sub> :	On the 11th? OK. Departing at 5:55pm arrives Seattle at 8pm, U.S. Air flight 115.
C <sub>7</sub> :	OK.

**Figure 24.4** Part of a conversation between a travel agent (A) and client (C).

Utterance  $A_1$ , in which the agent repeats *in May*, repeated below in boldface, shows the strongest form of grounding, in which the hearer displays their understanding by repeating verbatim part of the speakers words:

---

C<sub>1</sub>: ...I need to travel **in May**.  
 A<sub>1</sub>: And, what day **in May** did you want to travel?

---

This particular fragment doesn't have an example of an *acknowledgement*, but there's an example in another fragment:

---

C: He wants to fly from Boston  
 A: **Mm hmm**  
 C: to Baltimore Washington International

---

CONTINUER  
 BACKCHANNEL

The word *mm-hmm* here is a **continuer**, also often called a **backchannel** or an **acknowledgement token**. A continuer is a (short) optional utterance which acknowledges the content of the utterance of the other, and which doesn't require an acknowledgement by the other (Yngve, 1970; Jefferson, 1984; Schegloff, 1982; Ward and Tsukahara, 2000).

In Clark and Schaefer's third method, the speaker starts in on their relevant next contribution. We see a number of examples of this in the sample dialogue above, for example where the speaker asks a question and the hearer answers it. We mentioned these **adjacency pairs** above; other examples include PROPOSAL followed by ACCEPTANCE or REJECTION, APOLOGY followed by ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION, SUMMONS followed by ANSWER, and so on.

In a more subtle but very important kind of grounding act, the speaker can combine this method with the previous one. For example notice that whenever the client answers a question, the agent begins the next question with *And*. The *And* indicates to the client that the agent has successfully understood the answer to the last question:

---

And, what day in May did you want to travel?  
 ...  
 And you're flying into what city?  
 ...  
 And what time would you like to leave Pittsburgh?

---

As we will see in Sec. 24.5, the notions of grounding and contributions can be combined with speech acts to give a more sophisticated model of joint action in conversation; these more sophisticated models are called **dialogue acts**.

Grounding is just as crucial in human-machine conversation as it is in human conversation. The examples below, from Cohen et al. (2004), suggest how unnatural it sounds when a machine doesn't ground properly. The use of *Okay* makes (24.7) a much more natural response than (24.8) to ground a user's rejection:

- (24.7) System: Did you want to review some more of your personal profile?  
 Caller: No.  
 System: *Okay*, what's next?
- (24.8) System: Did you want to review some more of your personal profile?  
 Caller: No.  
 System: What's next?



Indeed, this kind of lack of grounding can cause errors. Stifelman et al. (1993) and Yankelovich et al. (1995) found that humans get confused when a conversational system doesn't give explicit acknowledgements.

#### 24.1.4 Conversational Structure

We have already seen how conversation is structured by adjacency pairs and contributions. Here we'll briefly discuss one aspect of the **overall organization** of a conversation: conversational openings. The openings of telephone conversations, for example, tend to have a 4-part structure (Clark, 1994; Schegloff, 1968, 1979):

**Stage 1:** Enter a conversation, with summons-response adjacency pair

**Stage 2:** Identification

**Stage 3:** Establish joint willingness to converse

**Stage 4:** The first topic is raised, usually by the caller.

These four stages appear in the opening of this short task-oriented conversation from Clark (1994).

Stage	Speaker & Utterance
1	A <sub>1</sub> : (rings B's telephone)
1,2	B <sub>1</sub> : Benjamin Holloway
2	A <sub>1</sub> : this is Professor Dwight's secretary, from Polymania College
2,3	B <sub>1</sub> : ooh yes –
4	A <sub>1</sub> : uh:m . about the: lexicology *seminar*
4	B <sub>1</sub> : *yes*

It is common for the person who answers the phone to speak first (since the caller's ring functions as the first part of the adjacency pair) but for the caller to bring up the first topic, as the caller did above concerning the "lexicology seminar". This fact that the caller usually brings up the first topic causes confusion when the answerer brings up the first topic instead; here's an example of this from the British directory enquiry service from Clark (1994):

Customer: (rings)

Operator: Directory Enquiries, for which town please?

Customer: Could you give me the phone number of um: Mrs. um: Smithson?

Operator: Yes, which town is this at please?

Customer: Huddleston.

Operator: Yes. And the name again?

Customer: Mrs. Smithson.

In the conversation above, the operator brings up the topic (*for which town please?*) in her first sentence, confusing the caller, who ignores this topic and brings up her own. This fact that callers expect to bring up the topic explains why conversational agents for call routing or directory information often use very open prompts like *How may I help you?* or *How may I direct your call?* rather than a directive prompt like *For which town please?*. Open prompts allow the caller to state their own topic, reducing recognition errors caused by customer confusion.

Conversation has many other kinds of structure, including the intricate nature of conversational closings and the wide use of presequences. We will discuss structure based on **coherence** in Sec. 24.7.

### 24.1.5 Conversational Implicature

We have seen that conversation is a kind of joint activity, in which speakers produce turns according to a systematic framework, and that the contributions made by these turns include a presentation phase of performing a kind of action, and an acceptance phase of grounding the previous actions of the interlocutor. So far we have only talked about what might be called the ‘infrastructure’ of conversation. But we have so far said nothing about the actual information that gets communicated from speaker to hearer in dialogue.

While Ch. 17 showed how we can compute meanings from sentences, it turns out that in conversation, the meaning of a contribution is often quite a bit extended from the compositional meaning that might be assigned from the words alone. This is because inference plays a crucial role in conversation. The interpretation of an utterance relies on more than just the literal meaning of the sentences. Consider the client’s response  $C_2$  from the sample conversation in Fig. 24.4, repeated here:

A<sub>1</sub>: And, what day in May did you want to travel?

C<sub>2</sub>: OK uh I need to be there for a meeting that’s from the 12th to the 15th.

Notice that the client does not in fact answer the question. The client merely states that he has a meeting at a certain time. The semantics for this sentence produced by a semantic interpreter will simply mention this meeting. What is it that licenses the agent to infer that the client is mentioning this meeting so as to inform the agent of the travel dates?

Now consider another utterance from the sample conversation, this one by the agent:

A<sub>4</sub>: ... There’s three non-stops today.

Now this statement would still be true if there were seven non-stops today, since if there are seven of something, there are by definition also three. But what the agent means here is that there are three **and not more than three** non-stops today. How is the client to infer that the agent means **only three** non-stops?

These two cases have something in common; in both cases the speaker seems to expect the hearer to draw certain inferences; in other words, the speaker is communicating more information than seems to be present in the uttered words. These kind of examples were pointed out by Grice (1975, 1978) as part of his theory of **conversational implicature**. **Implicature** means a particular class of licensed inferences. Grice proposed that what enables hearers to draw these inferences is that conversation is guided by a set of **maxims**, general heuristics which play a guiding role in the interpretation of conversational utterances. He proposed the following four maxims:

IMPLICATURE

MAXIMS

QUANTITY

- **Maxim of Quantity:** Be exactly as informative as is required:

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

- 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
- QUALITY
- **Maxim of Quality:** Try to make your contribution one that is true:
    1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
    2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
- RELEVANCE
- **Maxim of Relevance:** Be relevant.
- MANNER
- **Maxim of Manner:** Be perspicuous:
    1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
    2. Avoid ambiguity.
    3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
    4. Be orderly.

It is the Maxim of Quantity (specifically Quantity 1) that allows the hearer to know that *three non-stops* did not mean *seven non-stops*. This is because the hearer assumes the speaker is following the maxims, and thus if the speaker meant seven non-stops she would have said seven non-stops (“as informative as is required”). The Maxim of Relevance is what allows the agent to know that the client wants to travel by the 12th. The agent assumes the client is following the maxims, and hence would only have mentioned the meeting if it was relevant at this point in the dialogue. The most natural inference that would make the meeting relevant is the inference that the client meant the agent to understand that his departure time was before the meeting time.

## 24.2 BASIC DIALOGUE SYSTEMS


We’ve now seen a bit about how human dialogue works, although as we’ll see, not every aspect of human-human conversation is modeled in human-machine conversation. Let’s therefore turn now to the spoken dialogue systems used in commercial applications today.

Fig. 24.5 shows a typical architecture for a dialogue system. It has six components. The speech recognition and understanding components extract meaning from the input, while the generation and TTS components map from meaning to speech. The dialogue manager controls the whole process, along with a task manager which has knowledge about the task domain (such as air travel). We’ll go through each of these components in the next sections. Then we’ll explore more sophisticated research systems in following sections.

### 24.2.1 ASR component

The ASR (automatic speech recognition) component takes audio input, generally from a telephone, or from a PDA or desktop microphone, and returns a transcribed string of words, as discussed in chapter Ch. 9.

Various aspects of the ASR system may be optimized specifically for use in conversational agents. For example, the large vocabulary speech recognizers we discussed in Ch. 9 for dictation or transcription focused on transcribing any sentence on any topic using any English word. But for domain-dependent dialogue systems it is of little use



to be able to transcribe such a wide variety of sentences. The sentences that the speech recognizer needs to be able to transcribe need are just those that can be understood by the natural language understanding component. For this reason commercial dialogue systems generally use non-probabilistic language models based on finite-state grammars. These grammars are generally hand-written, and specify all possible responses that the system understands. We'll see an example of such a hand-written grammar for a VoiceXML system in Sec. 24.3. Such grammars-based language models can also be compiled automatically from, e.g., unification grammars used for natural language understanding (Rayner et al., 2006).

Because what the user says to the system is related to what the system has just said, language models in conversational agent are usually *dialogue-state dependent*. For example, if the system has just asked the user “What city are you departing from?”, the ASR language model can be constrained to only consist of city names, or perhaps sentences of the form ‘I want to (leave|depart) from [CITYNAME]’. These dialogue-state-specific language models often consist of hand-written finite-state (or even context-free) grammars as discussed above, one for each dialogue state.

In some systems, the understanding component is more powerful, and the set of sentences the system can understand is larger. In such cases, instead of a finite-state grammar, we can use an  $N$ -gram language model whose probabilities are similarly conditioned on the dialogue state.

Whether we use a finite-state, context-free, or an  $N$ -gram language model, we call such a dialogue-state dependent language model a **restrictive grammar**. When the system wants to constrain the user to respond to the system's last utterance, it can use a restrictive grammar. When the system wants to allow the user more options, it might mix this state-specific language model with a more general language model. As we will see, the choice between these strategies can be tuned based on how much *initiative* the user is allowed.

Speech recognition in dialogue, as well as in many other applications like dictation, has the advantage that the identity of the speaker remains constant across many utterances. This means that speaker adaptation techniques like MLLR and VTLN (Ch. 9) can be applied to improve recognition as the system hears more and more speech from the user.

Embedding an ASR engine in a dialogue system also requires that an ASR en-

gine to have realtime response, since users are unwilling to accept long pauses before responses. Dialogue systems also generally require that an ASR system return a **confidence** value for a sentence, which can then be used for example for deciding whether to ask the user to confirm a response.

### 24.2.2 NLU component

The NLU (natural language understanding) component of dialogue systems must produce a semantic representation which is appropriate for the dialogue task. Many speech-based dialogue systems, since as far back as the GUS system (Bobrow et al., 1977), are based on the frame-and-slot semantics discussed in Chapter 15. A travel system, for example, which has the goal of helping a user find an appropriate flight, would have a frame with slots for information about the flight; thus a sentence like *Show me morning flights from Boston to San Francisco on Tuesday* might correspond to the following filled-out frame (from Miller et al. (1994)):

```
SHOW:
FLIGHTS:
  ORIGIN:
    CITY: Boston
    DATE:
      DAY-OF-WEEK: Tuesday
    TIME:
      PART-OF-DAY: morning
  DEST:
    CITY: San Francisco
```

How does the NLU component generate this semantic representation? Some dialogue systems use general-purpose unification grammars with semantic attachments, such as the Core Language Engine introduced in Ch. 18. A parser produces a sentence meaning, from which the slot-fillers are extracted (Lewin et al., 1999).

Other dialogue systems rely on simpler domain-specific semantic analyzers, such as **semantic grammars**. A semantic grammar is a CFG in which the actual node names in the parse tree correspond to the semantic entities which are being expressed, as in the following grammar fragments:

```
SHOW          → show me | i want | can i see|...
DEPART_TIME_RANGE → (after|around|before) HOUR |
                    morning | afternoon | evening
HOUR          → one|two|three|four...|twelve (AMPM)
FLIGHTS       → (a) flight | flights
AMPM          → am | pm
ORIGIN        → from CITY
DESTINATION   → to CITY
CITY          → Boston | San Francisco | Denver | Washington
```


These grammars take the form of context-free grammars or recursive transition networks (Issar and Ward, 1993; Ward and Issar, 1994), and hence can be parsed by any standard CFG parsing algorithm, such as the CKY or Earley algorithms introduced in Ch. 13. The result of the CFG or RTN parse is a hierarchical labeling of the input string with semantic node labels:

SHOW	FLIGHTS	ORIGIN	DESTINATION	DEPART_DATE	DEPART_TIME
Show me	flights	from boston	to san francisco	on tuesday	morning

NORMALIZED

Since semantic grammar nodes like ORIGIN correspond to the slots in the frame, the slot-fillers can be read almost directly off the resulting parse above. It remains only to put the fillers into some sort of canonical form (for example dates can be **normalized** into a DD:MM:YY form, times can be put into 24-hour time, etc).

The semantic grammar approach is very widely used, but is unable to deal with ambiguity, and requires hand-written grammars that can be expensive and slow to create.




**Figure 24.6** A parse of a sentence in the TINA semantic grammar, after Seneff (1995).

Ambiguity can be addressed by adding probabilities to the grammar; one such probabilistic semantic grammar system is the TINA system (Seneff, 1995) shown in Fig. 24.6; note the mix of syntactic and semantic node names. The grammar rules in TINA are written by hand, but parse tree node probabilities are trained by a modified version of the SCFG method described in Ch. 14.

An alternative to semantic grammars that is probabilistic and also avoids hand-coding of grammars is the semantic HMM model of Pieraccini et al. (1991). The hidden states of this HMM are semantic slot labels, while the observed words are the fillers of the slots. Fig. 24.7 shows how a sequence of hidden states, corresponding to slot names, could be decoded from (or could generate) a sequence of observed words. Note that the model includes a hidden state called DUMMY which is used to generate words which do not fill any slots in the frame.

The goal of the HMM model is to compute the labeling of semantic roles  $C = c_1, c_2, \dots, c_i$  ( $C$  for ‘cases’ or ‘concepts’) that has the highest probability  $P(C|W)$  given some words  $W = w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n$ . As usual, we use Bayes Rule as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \operatorname{argmax}_C P(C|W) &= \operatorname{argmax}_C \frac{P(W|C)P(C)}{P(W)} \\
 (24.9) \qquad \qquad &= \operatorname{argmax}_C P(W|C)P(C)
 \end{aligned}$$



$$(24.10) \quad = \prod_{i=2}^N P(w_i | w_{i-1} \dots w_1, C) P(w_1 | C) \prod_{i=2}^M P(c_i | c_{i-1} \dots c_1)$$

The Pieraccini et al. (1991) model makes a simplification that the concepts (the hidden states) are generated by a Markov process (a concept  $M$ -gram model), and that the observation probabilities for each state are generated by a state-dependent (concept-dependent) word  $N$ -gram word model:

$$(24.11) \quad P(w_i | w_{i-1}, \dots, w_1, C) = P(w_i | w_{i-1}, \dots, w_{i-N+1}, c_i)$$

$$(24.12) \quad P(c_i | c_{i-1}, \dots, c_1) = P(c_i | c_{i-1}, \dots, c_{i-M+1})$$

Based on this simplifying assumption, the final equations used in the HMM model are as follows:

$$(24.13) \quad \operatorname{argmax}_C P(C|W) = \prod_{i=2}^N P(w_i | w_{i-1} \dots w_{i-N+1}, c_i) \prod_{i=2}^M P(c_i | c_{i-1} \dots c_{i-M+1})$$

These probabilities can be trained on a labeled training corpus, in which each sentence is hand-labeled with the concepts/slot-names associated with each string of words. The best sequence of concepts for a sentence, and the alignment of concepts to word sequences, can be computed by the standard Viterbi decoding algorithm.

In summary, the resulting HMM model is a generative model with two components. The  $P(C)$  component represents the choice of what meaning to express; it assigns a prior over sequences of semantic slots, computed by a concept  $N$ -gram.  $P(W|C)$  represents the choice of what words to use to express that meaning; the likelihood of a particular string of words being generated from a given slot. It is computed by a word  $N$ -gram conditioned on the semantic slot. This model is very similar to the HMM model for **named entity** detection we saw in Ch. 22. Technically, HMM models like this, in which each hidden state correspond to multiple output observations, are called **semi-HMMs**. In a classic HMM, by contrast, each hidden state corresponds to a single output observation.

SEMI-HMMS

Many other kinds of statistical models have been proposed for the semantic understanding component of dialogue systems. These include the Hidden Understanding

Model (HUM), which adds hierarchical structure to the HMM to combine the advantages of the semantic grammar and semantic HMM approaches (Miller et al., 1994, 1996, 2000), or the decision-list method of Rayner and Hockey (2003).

### 24.2.3 Generation and TTS components

The generation component of a conversational agent chooses the concepts to express to the user, plans out how to express these concepts in words, and assigns any necessary prosody to the words. The TTS component then takes these words and their prosodic annotations and synthesizes a waveform, as described in Ch. 8.


The generation task can be separated into two tasks: *what to say*, and *how to say it*. The **content planner** module addresses the first task, decides what content to express to the user, whether to ask a question, present an answer, and so on. The content planning component of dialogue systems is generally merged with the dialogue manager, and we will return to it below.

The **language generation** module addresses the second task, choosing the syntactic structures and words needed to express the meaning. Language generation modules are implemented in one of two ways. In the simplest and most common method, all or most of the words in the sentence to be uttered to the user are prespecified by the dialogue designer. This method is known as template-based generation, and the sentences created by these templates are often called **prompts**. While most of the words in the template are fixed, templates can include some variables which are filled in by the generator, as in the following:

PROMPTS

What time do you want to leave CITY-ORIG?  
Will you return to CITY-ORIG from CITY-DEST?

A second method for language generation relies on techniques from the field **natural language generation**. Here the dialogue manager builds a representation of the meaning of the utterance to be expressed, and passes this meaning representation to a full generator. Such generators generally have three components, a sentence planner, surface realizer, and prosody assigner. A sketch of this architecture is shown in Fig. 24.8. See Reiter and Dale (2000) for further information on natural language generation systems and their use in dialogue.



In the hand-designed prompts that are common in current systems, there are a number of important conversational and discourse constraints that must be implemented.



Like any discourse, a conversation needs to be coherent (Ch. 21). For example, as Cohen et al. (2004) show, the use of discourse markers and pronouns in the hand-built system prompts makes the dialogue in (24.15) more natural than the dialogue in (24.14):

(24.14) Please say the data.  
 ...  
 Please say the start time.  
 ...  
 Please say the duration.  
 ...  
 Please say the subject.

(24.15) First, tell me the date.  
 ...  
 Next, I'll need the time it starts.  
 ...  
 Thanks. <pause> Now, how long is it supposed to last?  
 ...  
 Last of all, I just need a brief description...

#### TAPERED PROMPTS

Another important case of discourse coherence occurs when particular prompts may need to be said to the user repeatedly. In these cases, it is standard in dialogue systems to use **tapered prompts**, prompts which get incrementally shorter. The following example from Cohen et al. (2004) shows a series of (hand-designed) tapered prompts:

(24.16) System: Now, what's the first company to add to your watch list?  
 Caller: Cisco  
 System: What's the next company name? (Or, you can say, "Finished.")  
 Caller: IBM  
 System: Tell me the next company name, or say, "Finished."  
 Caller: Intel  
 System: Next one?  
 Caller: America Online.  
 System: Next?  
 Caller: ...

Other constraints on generation are more specific to spoken dialogue, and refer to facts about human memory and attentional processes. For example, when humans are prompted to give a particular response, it taxes their memory less if the suggested response is the last thing they hear. Thus as Cohen et al. (2004) point out, the prompt "To hear the list again, say 'Repeat list'" is easier for users than "Say 'Repeat list' to hear the list again."


Similarly, presentation of long lists of query results (e.g., potential flights, or movies) can tax users. Thus most dialogue systems have content planning rules to deal with this. In the Mercury system for travel planning described in Seneff (2002), for example, a content planning rule specifies that if there are more than three flights to describe to the user, the system will just list the available airlines and describe explicitly only the earliest flight.

### 24.2.4 Dialogue Manager

The final component of a dialogue system is the dialogue manager, which controls the architecture and structure of the dialogue. The dialogue manager takes input from the ASR/NLU components, maintains some sort of state, interfaces with the task manager, and passes output to the NLG/TTS modules.

We saw a very simple dialogue manager in Chapter 2's ELIZA, whose architecture was a simple read-substitute-print loop. The system read in a sentence, applied a series of text transformations to the sentence, and then printed it out. No state was kept; the transformation rules were only aware of the current input sentence. In addition to its ability to interact with a task manager, a modern dialogue manager is very different than ELIZA's manager in both the amount of state that the manager keeps about the conversation, and the ability of the manager to model structures of dialogue above the level of a single response.

Four kinds of dialogue management architectures are most common. The simplest and most commercially developed architectures, finite-state and frame-based, are discussed in this section. Later sections discuss the more powerful information-state dialogue managers, including a probabilistic version of information-state managers based on Markov Decision Processes, and finally the more classic plan-based architectures.



The simplest dialogue manager architecture is a finite-state manager. For example, imagine a trivial airline travel system whose job was to ask the user for a departure city, a destination city, a time, and whether the trip was round-trip or not. Fig. 24.9 shows a sample dialogue manager for such a system. The states of the FSA correspond to questions that the dialogue manager asks the user, and the arcs correspond to actions to take depending on what the user responds. This system completely controls the conversation with the user. It asks the user a series of questions, ignoring (or misinterpreting)

anything the user says that is not a direct answer to the system's question, and then going on to the next question.

SYSTEM INITIATIVE  
SINGLE INITIATIVE  
INITIATIVE

Systems that control the conversation in this way are called **system initiative** or **single initiative** systems. We say that the speaker that is in control of the conversation has the **initiative**; in normal human-human dialogue, initiative shifts back and forth between the participants (Walker and Whittaker, 1990).<sup>1</sup> The limited single-initiative finite-state dialogue manager architecture has the advantage that the system always knows what question the user is answering. This means the system can prepare the speech recognition engine with a specific language model tuned to answers for this question. Knowing what the user is going to be talking about also makes the task of the natural language understanding engine easier. Most finite-state systems also allow **universal** commands. Universals are commands that can be said anywhere in the dialogue; every dialogue state recognizes the universal commands in addition to the answer to the question that the system just asked. Common universals include **help**, which gives the user a (possibly state-specific) help message, **start over** (or **main menu**), which returns the user to some specified main start state, and some sort of command to correct the system's understanding of the user's last statement (San-Segundo et al., 2001). System-initiative finite-state dialogue managers with universals may be sufficient for very simple tasks such as entering a credit card number, or a name and password, on the phone.

UNIVERSAL

Pure system-initiative finite-state dialogue manager architectures are probably too restricted, however, even for the relatively uncomplicated task of a spoken dialogue travel agent system. The problem is that pure system-initiative systems require that the user answer exactly the question that the system asked. But this can make a dialogue awkward and annoying. Users often need to be able to say something that is not exactly the answer to a single question from the system. For example, in a travel planning situation, users often want to express their travel goals with complex sentences that may answer more than one question at a time, as in Communicator example (24.17) repeated from Fig. 24.1, or ATIS example (24.18).

(24.17) Hi I'd like to fly to Seattle Tuesday morning

(24.18) I want a flight from Milwaukee to Orlando one way leaving after five p.m. on Wednesday.

A finite state dialogue system, as typically implemented, can't handle these kinds of utterances since it requires that the user answer each question as it is asked. Of course it is theoretically possible to create a finite state architecture which has a separate state for each possible subset of questions that the user's statement could be answering, but this would require a vast explosion in the number of states, making this a difficult architecture to conceptualize.

MIXED INITIATIVE

Therefore, most systems avoid the pure system-initiative finite-state approach and use an architecture that allows **mixed initiative**, in which conversational initiative can shift between the system and user at various points in the dialogue.

<sup>1</sup> Single initiative systems can also be controlled by the user, in which case they are called **user initiative** systems. Pure user initiative systems are generally used for stateless database querying systems, where the user asks single questions of the system, which the system converts into SQL database queries, and returns the results from some database.

FRAME-BASED  
FORM-BASED

One common mixed initiative dialogue architecture relies on the structure of the frame itself to guide the dialogue. These **frame-based** or **form-based** dialogue managers asks the user questions to fill slots in the frame, but allow the user to guide the dialogue by giving information that fills other slots in the frame. Each slot may be associated with a question to ask the user, of the following type:

Slot	Question
ORIGIN CITY	“From what city are you leaving?”
DESTINATION CITY	“Where are you going?”
DEPARTURE TIME	“When would you like to leave?”
ARRIVAL TIME	“When do you want to arrive?”

A frame-based dialogue manager thus needs to ask questions of the user, filling any slot that the user specifies, until it has enough information to perform a data base query, and then return the result to the user. If the user happens to answer two or three questions at a time, the system has to fill in these slots and then remember not to ask the user the associated questions for the slots. Not every slot need have an associated question, since the dialogue designer may not want the user deluged with questions. Nonetheless, the system must be able to fill these slots if the user happens to specify them. This kind of form-filling dialogue manager thus does away with the strict constraints that the finite-state manager imposes on the order that the user can specify information.

While some domains may be representable with a single frame, others, like the travel domain, seem to require the ability to deal with multiple frames. In order to handle possible user questions, we might need frames with general route information (for questions like *Which airlines fly from Boston to San Francisco?*), information about airfare practices (for questions like *Do I have to stay a specific number of days to get a decent airfare?*) or about car or hotel reservations. Since users may switch from frame to frame, the system must be able to disambiguate which slot of which frame a given input is supposed to fill, and then switch dialogue control to that frame.

Because of this need to dynamically switch control, frame-based systems are often implemented as **production rule** systems. Different types of inputs cause different productions to fire, each of which can flexibly fill in different frames. The production rules can then switch control based on factors such as the user’s input and some simple dialogue history like the last question that the system asked. The Mercury flight reservation system (Seneff and Polifroni, 2000; Seneff, 2002) uses a large ‘dialogue control table’ to store 200-350 rules, covering request for help, rules to determine if the user is referring to a flight in a list (“I’ll take that nine a.m. flight”), and rules to decide which flights to describe to the user first.

Now that we’ve seen the frame-based architecture, let’s return to our discussion of conversational initiative. It’s possible in the same agent to allow system-initiative, user-initiative, and mixed-initiative interactions. We said earlier that initiative refers to who has control of the conversation at any point. The phrase **mixed initiative** is generally used in two ways. It can mean that the system or the user could arbitrarily take or give up the initiative in various ways (Walker and Whittaker, 1990; Chu-Carroll and Brown, 1997). This kind of mixed initiative is difficult to achieve in current dialogue systems. In form-based dialogue system, the term mixed initiative is used for a more limited kind

## OPEN PROMPT

of shift, operationalized based on a combination of prompt type (open versus directive) and the type of grammar used in the ASR. An **open prompt** is one in which the system gives the user very few constraints, allowing the user to respond however they please, as in:

How may I help you?

## DIRECTIVE PROMPT

A **directive prompt** is one which explicitly instructs the user how to respond:

Say *yes* if you accept the call; otherwise, say *no*.

In Sec. 24.2.1 we defined a **restrictive** grammar as a language model which strongly constrains the ASR system, only recognizing proper responses to a given prompt.

Grammar	Prompt Type	
	Open	Directive
Restrictive	<i>Doesn't make sense</i>	System Initiative
Non-Restrictive	User Initiative	Mixed Initiative

**Figure 24.10** Operational definition of initiative, following Singh et al. (2002).

In Fig. 24.10 we then give the definition of initiative used in form-based dialogue systems, following Singh et al. (2002) and others. Here a system initiative interaction uses a directive prompt and a restrictive grammar; the user is told how to respond, and the ASR system is constrained to only recognize the responses that are prompted for. In user initiative, the user is given an open prompt, and the grammar must recognize any kind of response, since the user could say anything. Finally, in a mixed initiative interaction, the system gives the user a directive prompt with particular suggestions for response, but the non-restrictive grammar allows the user to respond outside the scope of the prompt.

Defining initiative as a property of the prompt and grammar type in this way allows systems to dynamically change their initiative type for different users and interactions. Novice users, or users with high speech recognition error, might be better served by more system initiative. Expert users, or those who happen to speak more recognizably, might do well with mixed or user initiative interactions. We will see in Sec. 24.6 how machine learning techniques can be used to choose initiative.

### 24.2.5 Dialogue Manager Error Handling: Confirmation/Rejection

In a dialogue system, mishearings are a particularly important class of problems, because speech recognition has such a high error rate. It is therefore important for dialogue systems to make sure that they have achieved the correct interpretation of the user's input. This is generally done by two methods: **confirming** understandings with the user, and **rejecting** utterances that the system is likely to have misunderstood.

## EXPLICIT CONFIRMATION

Various strategies can be employed for confirmation with the user. A system using the **explicit confirmation** strategy asks the user a direct question to confirm their understanding. Here are two examples of explicit confirmations from travel planning systems. The (boldface) confirmation questions are both yes-no questions, one using a

single sentence, the other presenting a declarative sentence followed by a tag question (a short question phrase like “right?” or “isn’t it?”):

---

S: Which city do you want to leave from?  
 U: Baltimore.  
 S: **Do you want to leave from Baltimore?**  
 U: Yes.

---

U: I’d like to fly from Denver Colorado to New York City on September twenty first in the morning on United Airlines  
 S: **Let’s see then. I have you going from Denver Colorado to New York on September twenty first. Is that correct?**  
 U: Yes

---

IMPLICIT  
CONFIRMATION

A system using the **implicit confirmation** strategy, rather than asking a direct question, uses the *demonstration* or *display* grounding strategies described above, confirming to the user by repeating back what the system understood the user to have said:

---

U: I want to travel to Berlin  
 S: **When do you want to travel to Berlin?**

---

U2: Hi I’d like to fly to Seattle Tuesday Morning  
 A3: **Traveling to Seattle on Tuesday, August eleventh in the morning.**  
 Your full name?

---

Explicit and implicit confirmation have complementary strengths. Explicit confirmation makes it easier for users to correct the system’s misrecognitions since the user can just answer ‘no’ to the confirmation question. But explicit confirmation is awkward and increases the length of the conversation (Danieli and Gerbino, 1995; Walker et al., 1998). The explicit confirmation dialogue fragments above sound non-natural and definitely non-human; implicit confirmation is much more conversationally natural.

REJECTION

Confirmation is just one kind of conversational action that a system has to express lack of understanding. Another option is **rejection**. An ASR system rejects an utterance by giving the user a prompt like *I’m sorry, I didn’t understand that*.

PROGRESSIVE  
PROMPTING

Sometimes utterances are rejected multiple times. This might mean that the user is using language that the system is unable to follow. Thus when an utterance is rejected, systems often follow a strategy of **progressive prompting** or **escalating detail** (Yankelovich et al., 1995; Weinschenk and Barker, 2000) as in this example from Cohen et al. (2004):

System: When would you like to leave?  
 Caller: Well, um, I need to be in New York in time for the first World Series game.  
 System: <reject>. Sorry, I didn’t get that. Please say the month and day you’d like to leave.  
 Caller: I wanna go on October fifteenth.

In this example, instead of just repeating ‘When would you like to leave?’, the rejection prompt gives the caller more guidance about how to formulate an utterance the system will understand. These *you-can-say* help messages are important in helping improve systems understanding performance (Bohus and Rudnicky, 2005). If the caller’s

utterance gets rejected yet again, the prompt can reflect this ('I *still* didn't get that'), and give the caller even more guidance.

#### RAPID REPROMPTING

An alternative strategy for error handling is **rapid reprompting**, in which the system rejects an utterance just by saying "I'm sorry?" or "What was that?". Only if the caller's utterance is rejected a second time does the system start applying progressive prompting. Cohen et al. (2004) summarizes experiments showing that users greatly prefer rapid reprompting as a first-level error prompt.

## 24.3 VOICEXML

#### VOICEXML

**VoiceXML** is the Voice Extensible Markup Language, an XML-based dialogue design language released by the W3C, and the most commonly used of the various speech markup languages (such as SALT). The goal of VoiceXML (or **vxml**) is to create simple audio dialogues of the type we have been describing, making use of ASR and TTS, and dealing with very simple mixed-initiative in a frame-based architecture. While VoiceXML is more common in the commercial rather than academic setting, it is a good way for the student to get a hands-on grasp of dialogue system design issues.

#### VXML

```
<form>
  <field name="transporttype">
    <prompt>
      Please choose airline, hotel, or rental car.
    </prompt>
    <grammar type="application/x=nuance-gsl">
      [airline hotel "rental car"]
    </grammar>
  </field>
  <block>
    <prompt>
      You have chosen <value expr="transporttype">.
    </prompt>
  </block>
</form>
```

**Figure 24.11** A minimal VoiceXML script for a form with a single field. User is prompted, and the response is then repeated back.

A VoiceXML document contains a set of dialogues, each of which can be a *form* or a *menu*. We will limit ourselves to introducing forms; see <http://www.voicexml.org/> for more information on VoiceXML in general. The VoiceXML document in Fig. 24.11 defines a form with a single field named 'transporttype'. The field has an attached prompt, *Please choose airline, hotel, or rental car*, which can be passed to the TTS system. It also has a grammar (language model) which is passed to the speech recognition engine to specify which words the recognizer is allowed to recognize. In the example in Fig. 24.11, the grammar consists of a disjunction of the three words *airline*, *hotel*, and *rental car*.

A `<form>` generally consists of a sequence of `<field>`s, together with a few other commands. Each field has a name (the name of the field in Fig. 24.11 is `transporttype`) which is also the name of the variable where the user's response will be stored. The

prompt associated with the field is specified via the `<prompt>` command. The grammar associated with the field is specified via the `<grammar>` command. VoiceXML supports various ways of specifying a grammar, including XML Speech Grammar, ABNF, and commercial standards, like Nuance GSL. We will be using the Nuance GSL format in the following examples.

The VoiceXML interpreter walks through a form in document order, repeatedly selecting each item in the form. If there are multiple fields, the interpreter will visit each one in order. The interpretation order can be changed in various ways, as we will see later. The example in Fig. 24.12 shows a form with three fields, for specifying the origin, destination, and flight date of an airline flight.

The prologue of the example shows two global defaults for error handling. If the user doesn't answer after a prompt (i.e., silence exceeds a timeout threshold), the VoiceXML interpreter will play the `<noinput>` prompt. If the user says something, but it doesn't match the grammar for that field, the VoiceXML interpreter will play the `<nomatch>` prompt. After any failure of this type, it is normal to re-ask the user the question that failed to get a response. Since these routines can be called from any field, and hence the exact prompt will be different every time, VoiceXML provides a `<reprompt\>` command, which will repeat the prompt for whatever field caused the error.

The three fields of this form show another feature of VoiceXML, the `<filled>` tag. The `<filled>` tag for a field is executed by the interpreter as soon as the field has been filled by the user. Here, this feature is used to give the user a confirmation of their input.

The last field, `departdate`, shows another feature of VoiceXML, the `type` attribute. VoiceXML 2.0 specifies seven built-in grammar types, `boolean`, `currency`, `date`, `digits`, `number`, `phone`, and `time`. Since the type of this field is `date`, a data-specific language model (grammar) will be automatically passed to the speech recognizer, so we don't need to specify the grammar here explicitly.

Fig. 24.13 gives a final example which shows mixed initiative. In a mixed initiative dialogue, users can choose not to answer the question that was asked by the system. For example, they might answer a different question, or use a long sentence to fill in multiple slots at once. This means that the VoiceXML interpreter can no longer just evaluate each field of the form in order; it needs to skip fields whose values are set. This is done by a *guard condition*, a test that keeps a field from being visited. The default guard condition for a field tests to see if the field's form item variable has a value, and if so the field is not interpreted.

Fig. 24.13 also shows a much more complex use of a grammar. This grammar is a CFG grammar with two rewrite rules, named `Flight` and `City`. The Nuance GSL grammar formalism uses parentheses `()` to mean concatenation and square brackets `[]` to mean disjunction. Thus a rule like (24.19) means that `Wantsentence` can be expanded as `i want to fly` or `i want to go`, and `Airports` can be expanded as `san francisco` or `denver`.

```
(24.19) Wantsentence (i want to [fly go])
        Airports [(san francisco) denver]
```

Grammar rules can refer to other grammar rules recursively, and so in the grammar



```

<noinput>
I'm sorry, I didn't hear you. <reprompt/>
</noinput>

<nomatch>
I'm sorry, I didn't understand that. <reprompt/>
</nomatch>

<form>
<block> Welcome to the air travel consultant. </block>
<field name="origin">
<prompt> Which city do you want to leave from? </prompt>
<grammar type="application/x=nuance-gsl">
[(san francisco) denver (new york) barcelona]
</grammar>
<filled>
<prompt> OK, from <value expr="origin"> </prompt>
</filled>
</field>
<field name="destination">
<prompt> And which city do you want to go to? </prompt>
<grammar type="application/x=nuance-gsl">
[(san francisco) denver (new york) barcelona]
</grammar>
<filled>
<prompt> OK, to <value expr="destination"> </prompt>
</filled>
</field>
<field name="departdate" type="date">
<prompt> And what date do you want to leave? </prompt>
<filled>
<prompt> OK, on <value expr="departdate"> </prompt>
</filled>
</field>
<block>
<prompt> OK, I have you are departing from <value expr="origin">
to <value expr="destination"> on <value expr="departdate">
</prompt>
send the info to book a flight...
</block>
</form>

```

**Figure 24.12** A VoiceXML script for a form with 3 fields, which confirms each field and handles the `noinput` and `nomatch` situations.

in Fig. 24.13 we see the grammar for `Flight` referring to the rule for `City`.

VoiceXML grammars take the form of CFG grammars with optional semantic attachments. The semantic attachments are generally either a text string (such as "denver, colorado") or a slot and a filler. We can see an example of the former in the semantic attachments for the `City` rule (the `return` statements at the end of each line), which pass up the city and state name. The semantic attachments for the `Flight` rule shows the latter case, where the slot (`<origin>` or `<destination>` or both) is filled with the value passed up in the variable `x` from the `City` rule.

Because Fig. 24.13 is a mixed initiative grammar, the grammar has to be applicable to any of the fields. This is done by making the expansion for `Flight` a disjunction; note that it allows the user to specify only the origin city, only the destination city, or both.

```

<noinput>    I'm sorry, I didn't hear you. <reprompt/> </noinput>
<nomatch> I'm sorry, I didn't understand that. <reprompt/> </nomatch>
<form>
  <grammar type="application/x=nuance-gsl">
    <![CDATA[
      Flight ( ?[
        (i [wanna (want to)] [fly go])
        (i'd like to [fly go])
        ((i wanna)(i'd like a)] flight)
      ]
      [
        ( [from leaving departing] City:x) {<origin $x>}
        ( [(?going to)(arriving in)] City:x) {<destination $x>}
        ( [from leaving departing] City:x
          [(?going to)(arriving in)] City:y) {<origin $x> <destination $y>}
        ]
      ]?please
    )
    City [ [(san francisco) (s f o)] {return( "san francisco, california")}
          [(denver) (d e n)] {return( "denver, colorado")}
          [(seattle) (s t x)] {return( "seattle, washington")}
        ]
  ]> </grammar>
  <initial name="init">
    <prompt> Welcome to the air travel consultant. What are your travel plans? </prompt>
  </initial>
  <field name="origin">
    <prompt> Which city do you want to leave from? </prompt>
    <filled>
      <prompt> OK, from <value expr="origin"> </prompt>
    </filled>
  </field>
  <field name="destination">
    <prompt> And which city do you want to go to? </prompt>
    <filled>
      <prompt> OK, to <value expr="destination"> </prompt>
    </filled>
  </field>
  <block>
    <prompt> OK, I have you are departing from <value expr="origin">
      to <value expr="destination">. </prompt>
    send the info to book a flight...
  </block>
</form>

```

**Figure 24.13** A mixed initiative VoiceXML dialogue. The grammar allows sentences which specify the origin or destination cities or both. User can respond to the initial prompt by specifying origin city, destination city, or both.

## 24.4 DIALOGUE SYSTEM DESIGN AND EVALUATION

### 24.4.1 Designing Dialogue Systems

VUI How does a dialogue system developer choose dialogue strategies, architectures, prompts, error messages, and so on? This process is often called **VUI (Voice User Interface)** design. The **user-centered design** principles of Gould and Lewis (1985) are:

- 1. Study the user and task:** Understand the potential users and the nature of the task, via interviews with users and investigation of similar systems, and study of related human-human dialogues.

## WIZARD-OF-OZ

**2. Build simulations and prototypes:** In **Wizard-of-Oz systems** (WOZ) or PNAM-BIC (Pay No Attention to the Man BehInd the Curtain) systems, the users interact with what they think is a software system, but is in fact a human operator (“wizard”) behind some disguising interface software (e.g. Gould et al., 1983; Good et al., 1984; Fraser and Gilbert, 1991). The name comes from the children’s book *The Wizard of Oz* (Baum, 1900), in which the Wizard turned out to be just a simulation controlled by a man behind a curtain. A WOZ system can be used to test out an architecture before implementation; only the interface software and databases need to be in place. The wizard’s linguistic output can be disguised by a text-to-speech system, or via text-only interactions. It is difficult for the wizard to exactly simulate the errors, limitations, or time constraints of a real system; results of WOZ studies are thus somewhat idealized, but still can provide a useful first idea of the domain issues.

## BARGE-IN

**3. Iteratively test the design on users:** An iterative design cycle with embedded user testing is essential in system design (Nielsen, 1992; Cole et al., 1994, 1997; Yankelovich et al., 1995; Landauer, 1995). For example Stifelman et al. (1993) built a system that originally required the user to press a key to interrupt the system. They found in user testing that users instead tried to interrupt the system (**barge-in**), suggesting a redesign of the system to recognize overlapped speech. The iterative method is also very important for designing prompts which cause the user to respond in understandable or normative ways: Kamm (1994) and Cole et al. (1993) found that **directive prompts** (“Say *yes* if you accept the call, otherwise, say *no*”) or the use of constrained forms (Oviatt et al., 1993) produced better results than open prompts like “Will you accept the call?”. Simulations can also be used at this stage; user simulations that interact with a dialogue system can help test the interface for brittleness or errors (Chung, 2004).

## DIRECTIVE PROMPTS

See Cohen et al. (2004), Harris (2005) for more details on conversational interface design.

## 24.4.2 Dialogue System Evaluation

As the previous section suggested, user testing and evaluation is crucial in dialogue system design. Computing a *user satisfaction rating* can be done by having users interact with a dialogue system to perform a task, and then having them complete a questionnaire (Shriberg et al., 1992; Polifroni et al., 1992; Stifelman et al., 1993; Yankelovich et al., 1995; Möller, 2002). For example Fig. 24.14 shows multiple-choice questions adapted from Walker et al. (2001); responses are mapped into the range of 1 to 5, and then averaged over all questions to get a total user satisfaction rating.

It is often economically infeasible to run complete user satisfaction studies after every change in a system. For this reason it is often useful to have performance evaluation heuristics which correlate well with human satisfaction. A number of such factors and heuristics have been studied. One method that has been used to classify these factors is based on the idea that an optimal dialogue system is one which allows a user to accomplish their goals (maximizing task success) with the least problems (minimizing costs). Then we can study metrics which correlate with these two criteria.

<b>TTS Performance</b>	Was the system easy to understand ?
<b>ASR Performance</b>	Did the system understand what you said?
<b>Task Ease</b>	Was it easy to find the message/flight/train you wanted?
<b>Interaction Pace</b>	Was the pace of interaction with the system appropriate?
<b>User Expertise</b>	Did you know what you could say at each point?
<b>System Response</b>	How often was the system sluggish and slow to reply to you?
<b>Expected Behavior</b>	Did the system work the way you expected it to?
<b>Future Use</b>	Do you think you'd use the system in the future?

**Figure 24.14** User satisfaction survey, adapted from Walker et al. (2001).

**Task Completion Success:** Task success can be measured by evaluating the correctness of the total solution. For a frame-based architecture, this might be the percentage of slots that were filled with the correct values, or the percentage of subtasks that were completed (Polifroni et al., 1992). Since different dialogue systems may be applied to different tasks, it is hard to compare them on this metric, so Walker et al. (1997) suggested using the Kappa coefficient,  $\kappa$ , to compute a completion score which is normalized for chance agreement and better enables cross-system comparison.


**Efficiency Cost:** Efficiency costs are measures of the system's efficiency at helping users. This can be measured via the total elapsed time for the dialogue in seconds, the number of total turns or of system turns, or the total number of queries (Polifroni et al., 1992). Other metrics include the number of system non-responses, and the "turn correction ratio": the number of system or user turns that were used solely to correct errors, divided by the total number of turns (Danieli and Gerbino, 1995; Hirschman and Pao, 1993).

**Quality Cost:** Quality cost measures other aspects of the interaction that affect users' perception of the system. One such measure is the number of times the ASR system failed to return any sentence, or the number of ASR rejection prompts. Similar metrics include the number of times the user had to **barge-in** (interrupt the system), or the number of time-out prompts played when the user didn't respond quickly enough. Other quality metrics focus on how well the system understood and responded to the user. This can include the inappropriateness (verbose or ambiguous) of the system's questions, answers, and error messages (Zue et al., 1989), or the correctness of each question, answer, or error message (Zue et al., 1989; Polifroni et al., 1992). A very important quality cost is **concept accuracy** or **concept error rate**, which measures the percentage of semantic concepts that the NLU component returns correctly. For frame-based architectures this can be measured by counting the percentage of slots that are filled with the correct meaning. For example if the sentence 'I want to arrive in Austin at 5:00' is misrecognized to have the semantics "DEST-CITY: Boston, Time: 5:00" the concept accuracy would be 50% (one of two slots are wrong).

How should these success and cost metrics be combined and weighted? One approach is the PARADISE algorithm (PARADigm for Dialogue System Evaluation), which applies multiple regression to this problem. The algorithm first assigns each dialogue a user satisfaction rating using questionnaires like the one in Fig. 24.14. A set of cost and success factors like those above is then treated as a set of independent

BARGE-IN

CONCEPT  
ACCURACY



factors; multiple regression is used to train a weight for each factor, measuring its importance in accounting for user satisfaction. Fig. 24.15 shows the particular model of performance that the PARADISE experiments have assumed. Each box is related to a set of factors that we summarized on the previous page. The resulting metric can be used to compare quite different dialogue strategies; evaluations using methods like PARADISE have suggested that task completion and concept accuracy are may be the most important predictors of user satisfaction; see Walker et al. (1997) and Walker et al. (2001, 2002).

A wide variety of other evaluation metrics and taxonomies have been proposed for describing the quality of spoken dialogue systems (Fraser, 1992; Möller, 2002, 2004, inter alia).

## 24.5 INFORMATION-STATE & DIALOGUE ACTS

The basic frame-based dialogue systems we have introduced so far are only capable of limited domain-specific conversations. This is because the semantic interpretation and generation processes in frame-based dialogue systems are based only on what is needed to fill slots. In order to be usable for more than just form-filling applications, a conversational agent needs to be able to do things like decide when the user has asked a question, made a proposal, or rejected a suggestion, and needs to be able to ground a users utterance, ask clarification questions, and suggest plans. This suggests that a conversational agent needs sophisticated models of interpretation and generation in terms of speech acts and grounding, and a more sophisticated representation of the dialogue context than just a list of slots.

In this section we sketch a more advanced architecture for dialogue management which allows for these more sophisticated components. This model is generally called the **information-state** architecture (Traum and Larsson, 2003, 2000), although we will use the term loosely to include architectures such as Allen et al. (2001). A probabilistic architecture which can be seen as an extension of the information-state approach, the **Markov decision process** model, will be described in the next section. The term **information-state architecture** is really a cover term for a number of quite different efforts toward more sophisticated agents; we'll assume here a structure consisting of 5


components:

- the information state (the ‘discourse context’ or ‘mental model’)
- a dialogue act interpreter (or “interpretation engine”)
- a dialogue act generator (or “generation engine”)
- a set of update rules, which update the information state as dialogue acts are interpreted, and which include rules to generate dialogue acts.
- a control structure to select which update rules to apply

The term **information state** is intended to be very abstract, and might include things like the discourse context and the common ground of the two speakers, the beliefs or intentions of the speakers, user models, and so on. Crucially, information state is intended to be a more complex notion than the static states in a finite-state dialogue manager; the current state includes the values of many variables, the discourse context, and other elements that are not easily modeled by a state-number in a finite network.

Dialogue acts are an extension of speech acts which integrate ideas from grounding theory, and will be defined more fully in the next subsection. The interpretation engine takes speech as input and figures out sentential semantics and an appropriate dialogue act. The dialogue act generator takes dialogue acts and sentential semantics as input and produces text/speech as output.

Finally, the update rules modify the information state with the information from the dialogue acts. These update rules are a generalization of the production rules used in frame-based dialogue systems described above (Seneff and Polifroni, 2000, *inter alia*). A subset of update rules, called **selection rules**, are used to generate dialogue acts. For example, an update rule might say that when the interpretation engine recognizes an assertion, that the information state should be updated with the information in the assertion, and an obligation to perform a grounding act needs to be added to the information state. When a question is recognized, an update rule might specify the need to answer the question. We can refer to the combination of the update rules and control structure as the *Behavioral Agent* (Allen et al., 2001), as suggested in Fig. 24.16.



While the intuition of the information-state model is quite simple, the details can

be quite complex. The information state might involve rich discourse models such as Discourse Representation Theory or sophisticated models of the user's belief, desire, and intention (which we will return to in Sec. 24.7). Instead of describing a particular implementation here, we will focus in the next few sections on the dialogue act interpretation and generation engines, and a probabilistic information-state architecture via Markov decision processes.

### 24.5.1 Dialogue Acts

DIALOGUE ACT  
MOVES

As we implied above, the speech acts as originally defined by Austin don't model key features of conversation such as grounding, contributions, adjacency pairs and so on. In order to capture these conversational phenomena, we use an extension of speech acts called **dialogue acts** (Bunt, 1994) (or **dialogue moves** or **conversational moves** (Power, 1979; Carletta et al., 1997b)). A dialogue act extends speech acts with internal structure related specifically to these other conversational functions (Allen and Core, 1997; Bunt, 2000).

A wide variety of dialogue act tagsets have been proposed. Fig. 24.17 shows a very domain-specific tagset for the Verbmobil two-party scheduling domain, in which speakers were asked to plan a meeting at some future date. Notice that it has many very domain-specific tags, such as SUGGEST, used for when someone proposes a particular date to meet, and ACCEPT and REJECT, used to accept or reject a proposal for a date. Thus it has elements both from the presentation and acceptance phases of the Clark contributions discussed on page 7.

Tag	Example
THANK	<i>Thanks</i>
GREET	<i>Hello Dan</i>
INTRODUCE	<i>It's me again</i>
BYE	<i>Allright bye</i>
REQUEST-COMMENT	<i>How does that look?</i>
SUGGEST	<i>from thirteenth through seventeenth June</i>
REJECT	<i>No Friday I'm booked all day</i>
ACCEPT	<i>Saturday sounds fine,</i>
REQUEST-SUGGEST	<i>What is a good day of the week for you?</i>
INIT	<i>I wanted to make an appointment with you</i>
GIVE_REASON	<i>Because I have meetings all afternoon</i>
FEEDBACK	<i>Okay</i>
DELIBERATE	<i>Let me check my calendar here</i>
CONFIRM	<i>Okay, that would be wonderful</i>
CLARIFY	<i>Okay, do you mean Tuesday the 23rd?</i>
DIGRESS	<i>[we could meet for lunch] and eat lots of ice cream</i>
MOTIVATE	<i>We should go to visit our subsidiary in Munich</i>
GARBAGE	<i>Oops, I-</i>

**Figure 24.17** The 18 high-level dialogue acts used in Verbmobil-1, abstracted over a total of 43 more specific dialogue acts. Examples are from Jekat et al. (1995).

There are a number of more general and domain-independent dialogue act tagsets. In the DAMSL (Dialogue Act Markup in Several Layers) architecture inspired by the

Act type	Sample Acts
turn-taking	take-turn, keep-turn, release-turn, assign-turn
grounding	acknowledge, repair, continue
core speech acts	inform, wh-question, accept, request, offer
argumentation	elaborate, summarize, question-answer, clarify

**Figure 24.18** Conversation act types, from Traum and Hinkelman (1992).

work of Clark and Schaefer (1989) and Allwood et al. (1992), Allwood (1995) each utterance is tagged for two functions, **forward looking functions** like speech act functions, and the **backward looking** function, like grounding and answering, which ‘look back’ to the interlocutor’s previous utterance (Allen and Core, 1997; Walker et al., 1996; Carletta et al., 1997a; Core et al., 1999).

CONVERSATION  
ACTS

Traum and Hinkelman (1992) proposed that the core speech acts and grounding acts that constitute dialogue acts could fit into an even richer hierarchy of **conversation acts**. Fig. 24.18 shows the four levels of act types they propose, with the two middle levels corresponding to DAMSL dialogue acts (grounding and core speech acts). The two new levels include turn-taking acts and *argumentation* relation, a conversational version of the coherence relations of Ch. 21.

The acts form a hierarchy, in that performance of an act at a higher level (for example a core speech act) entails performance of a lower level act (taking a turn). We will see the use of conversational acts in generation later on in this section, and will return to the question of coherence and dialogue structure in Sec. 24.7.

### 24.5.2 Interpreting Dialogue Acts

How can we do dialogue act interpretation, deciding whether a given input is a QUESTION, a STATEMENT, a SUGGEST (directive), or an ACKNOWLEDGEMENT? Perhaps we can just rely on surface syntax? We saw in Ch. 12 that yes-no-questions in English have **aux-inversion** (the auxiliary verb precedes the subject) statements have declarative syntax (no aux-inversion), and commands have no syntactic subject:

- (24.20) YES-NO-QUESTION Will breakfast be served on USAir 1557?  
 STATEMENT I don’t care about lunch  
 COMMAND Show me flights from Milwaukee to Orlando.

Alas, as is clear from Abbott and Costello’s famous *Who’s on First* routine at the beginning of the chapter, the mapping from surface form to illocutionary act is complex. For example, the following ATIS utterance looks like a YES-NO-QUESTION meaning something like *Are you capable of giving me a list of...?*:

- (24.21) Can you give me a list of the flights from Atlanta to Boston?

In fact, however, this person was not interested in whether the system was *capable* of giving a list; this utterance was a polite form of a REQUEST, meaning something more like *Please give me a list of...* Thus what looks on the surface like a QUESTION can really be a REQUEST.

Similarly, what looks on the surface like a STATEMENT can really be a QUESTION. The very common CHECK question (Carletta et al., 1997b; Labov and Fanshel, 1977),



is used to ask an interlocutor to confirm something that she has privileged knowledge about. CHECKS have declarative surface form:

A	OPEN-OPTION	I was wanting to make some arrangements for a trip that I'm going to be taking uh to LA uh beginning of the week after next.
B	HOLD	OK uh let me pull up your profile and I'll be right with you here. [pause]
B	CHECK	<b>And you said you wanted to travel next week?</b>
A	ACCEPT	Uh yes.

Utterances that use a surface statement to ask a question, or a surface question to issue a request, are called **indirect speech acts**.

In order to resolve these dialogue act ambiguities we can model dialogue act interpretation as a supervised classification task, with dialogue act labels as hidden classes to be detected. We train classifiers on a corpus in which each utterance is hand-labeled for dialogue acts. The features used for dialogue act interpretation derive from the conversational context and from the act's **microgrammar** (Goodwin, 1996) (its characteristic lexical, grammatical, and prosodic properties):

1. **Words and Collocations:** *Please* or *would you* is a good cue for a REQUEST, *are you* for YES-NO-QUESTIONS, detected via **dialogue-specific N-gram** grammars.
2. **Prosody:** Rising pitch is a good cue for a YES-NO-QUESTION, while declarative utterances (like STATEMENTS) have **final lowering**: a drop in F0 at the end of the utterance. Loudness or stress can help distinguish the *yeah* that is an AGREEMENT from the *yeah* that is a BACKCHANNEL. We can extract acoustic correlates of prosodic features like F0, duration, and energy.
3. **Conversational Structure:** A *yeah* following a proposal is probably an AGREEMENT; a *yeah* after an INFORM is likely a BACKCHANNEL. Drawing on the idea of adjacency pairs (Schegloff, 1968; Sacks et al., 1974), we can model conversational structure as a bigram of dialogue acts

Formally our goal is to find the dialogue act  $d^*$  that has the highest posterior probability  $P(d|o)$  given the observation of a sentence,

$$\begin{aligned}
 d^* &= \operatorname{argmax}_d P(d|o) \\
 &= \operatorname{argmax}_d \frac{P(d)P(o|d)}{P(o)} \\
 &= \operatorname{argmax}_d P(d)P(o|d)
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{24.22}$$

Making some simplifying assumptions (that the prosody of the sentence  $f$  and the word sequence  $W$  are independent, and that the prior of a dialogue act can be modeled by the conditional given the previous dialogue act) we can estimate the observation likelihood for a dialogue act  $d$  as in (24.23):

$$P(o|d) = P(f|d)P(W|d) \tag{24.23}$$

$$d^* = \operatorname{argmax}_d P(d|d_{t-1})P(f|d)P(W|d) \tag{24.24}$$

where

$$(24.25) \quad P(W|d) = \prod_{i=2}^N P(w_i|w_{i-1} \dots w_{i-N+1}, d)$$

Training the prosodic predictor to compute  $P(f|d)$  has often been done with a decision tree. Shriberg et al. (1998), for example, built a CART tree to distinguish the four dialogue acts STATEMENT (S), YES-NO QUESTION (QY), DECLARATIVE-QUESTION like CHECK (QD) and WH-QUESTION (QW) based on acoustic features as the slope of F0 at the end of the utterance, the average energy at different places in the utterance, and various normalized duration measures. Fig. 24.19 shows the decision tree which gives the posterior probability  $P(d|f)$  of a dialogue act  $d$  type given a set of acoustic features  $f$ . Note that the difference between S and QY toward the right of the tree is based on the feature `norm_f0_diff` (normalized difference between mean F0 of end and penultimate regions), while the difference between QW and QD at the bottom left is based on `utt_grad`, which measures F0 slope across the whole utterance.

Since decision trees produce a posterior probability  $P(d|f)$ , and equation (24.24) requires a likelihood  $P(f|d)$ , we need to massage the output of the decision tree by Bayesian inversion (dividing by the prior  $P(d_i)$  to turn it into a likelihood); we saw this same process with the use of SVMs and MLPs instead of Gaussian classifiers in speech recognition in Sec. ???. After all our simplifying assumptions the resulting equation for choosing a dialogue act tag would be:

$$(24.26) \quad \begin{aligned} d^* &= \operatorname{argmax}_d P(d)P(f|d)P(W|d) \\ &= \operatorname{argmax}_d P(d|d_{t-1}) \frac{P(d|f)}{P(d)} \prod_{i=2}^N P(w_i|w_{i-1} \dots w_{i-N+1}, d) \end{aligned}$$


### 24.5.3 Detecting Correction Acts

CORRECTION

In addition to general-purpose dialogue act interpretation, we may want to build special-purpose detectors for particular acts. Let's consider one such detector, for the recognition of user **correction** of system errors. If a dialogue system misrecognizes an utterance (usually as a result of ASR errors) the user will generally correct the error by repeating themselves, or rephrasing the utterance. Dialogue systems need to recognize that users are doing a correction, and then figure out what the user is trying to correct, perhaps by interacting with the user further.

HYPERARTICULATION

Unfortunately, corrections are actually *harder* to recognize than normal sentences. Swerts et al. (2000) found that corrections in the TOOT dialogue system were misrecognized about twice as often (in terms of WER) as non-corrections. One reason for this is that speakers use a very different prosodic style called **hyperarticulation** for corrections. In hyperarticulated speech, some part of the utterance has exaggerated energy, duration, or F0 contours, such as *I said BAL-TI-MORE, not Boston* (Wade et al., 1992; Oviatt et al., 1998; Levow, 1998; Hirschberg et al., 2001).



**Figure 24.19** Decision tree for classifying DECLARATIVE QUESTIONS (QD), STATEMENT (S), YES-NO QUESTIONS (QY), and WH-QUESTIONS (QW), after Shriberg et al. (1998). Each node in the tree shows four probabilities, one for each of the four dialogue acts in the order QD, S, QY, QW; the most likely of the four is shown as the label for the node. Note that questions are shorter than statements (`cont_speech_frames`), that QY's rise at the end (`end_grad`), and that QD's rise throughout the utterance (`utt_grad`).

Speakers use various strategies to make corrections; Swerts et al. (2000) categorize these as repetition (REP), paraphrase (PAR), adding content (ADD), and omitting content (OMIT), as shown in Fig. 24.20. They found that most corrections were repetitions and omissions rather than paraphrases.

Various machine learning classifiers have been applied to the problem of detecting correction acts. Useful features include lexical information (words like “no”, “correction”, “I don’t”, swear words), prosodic and hyperarticulation features (increases in F0 range, pause duration, and word duration, generally normalized by the values for previous sentences), features indicating utterance length, ASR features (confidence, language model probability), and various dialogue features (Levow, 1998; Hirschberg et al., 2001; Bulyko et al., 2005).

In addition to correction detection, a conversational agent also needs appropriate control or update rules in the dialogue manager (Bulyko et al., 2005).

### 24.5.4 Generating Dialogue Acts: Confirmation and Rejection

Deciding which dialogue acts to generate has received much less attention than dialogue act interpretation. Stent (2002) is one recent model of dialogue act generation in the TRIPS system (Allen et al., 2001), based on Conversation Acts (page 32) and the BDI model to be described in Sec. 24.7. Stent uses a set of update rules for content

Turn	Corr Type
S On which day of the week do you want to leave?	
S Sorry, I didn't hear anything from you. Please tell me your departure date	
U <i>Um tomorrow</i>	NA
S You can say the departure date. For example, you can say 'today' or 'tomorrow'. Or you can say 'Monday', 'Tuesday', 'Wednesday'...	
U <i>Tomorrow</i>	REP
S You can say the departure date. For example, you can say 'today' or 'tomorrow'. Or you can say 'Monday', 'Tuesday', 'Wednesday'...	
U <i>Saturday</i>	PAR
S Do you want to leave on Saturday?	
U Yes	
S What time do you want to leave?	
U Eight o'clock A M	
S Do you want to leave around ten oclock p-m	
U <i>Eight o'clock</i>	OMIT
S Do you want to leave around ten oclock p-m	
U <i>No</i>	OMIT
S What time do you want to leave?	
U <i>Eight o'clock A M</i>	ADD

**Figure 24.20** Dialogue fragment from the TOOT system labeled for correction type, from Swerts et al. (2000).

Cue	Turn-taking acts signaled
um	KEEP-TURN, TAKE-TURN, RELEASE-TURN
<lipsmack>, <click>, so, uh	KEEP-TURN, TAKE-TURN
you know, isn't that so	ASSIGN-TURN

**Figure 24.21** Language used to perform turn-taking acts, from Stent (2002).

planning. One such rule says that if a user has just released the turn, the system can perform a TAKE-TURN act. Another rule says that if the system has a problem-solving need to summarize some information for the user, then it should use the ASSERT conversation act with that information as the semantic content. The content is then mapped into words using the standard techniques of natural language generation systems (see e.g., Reiter and Dale (2000)) After an utterance is generated, the information state (discourse context) is updated with its words, syntactic structure, semantic form, and semantic and conversation act structure. We will sketch in Sec. 24.7 some of the issues in modeling and planning that make generation a tough ongoing research effort.

Stent showed that a crucial issue in dialogue generation that doesn't occur in monologue text generation is turn-taking acts. Fig. 24.21 shows some example of the turn-taking function of various linguistic forms, from her labeling of conversation acts in the Monroe corpus.

A focus of much work on dialogue act generation is the task of of generating the **confirmation** and **rejection** acts discussed in Sec. 24.2.5. Because this task is often solved by probabilistic methods, we'll begin this discussion here, but continue it in the

following section.

For example, while early dialogue systems tended to fix the choice of **explicit** versus **implicit** confirmation, recent systems treat the question of how to confirm more like a dialogue act generation task, in which the confirmation strategy is adaptive, changing from sentence to sentence.

Various factors can be included in the information-state and then used as features to a classifier in making this decision:

**ASR confidence:** The **confidence** that the ASR system assigns to an utterance can be used by explicitly confirming low-confidence sentences (Bouwman et al., 1999; San-Segundo et al., 2001; Litman et al., 1999; Litman and Pan, 2002). Recall that we briefly defined confidence on page ?? as a metric that the speech recognizer can give to a higher-level process (like dialogue) to indicate how confident the recognizer is that the word string that it returns is a good one. Confidence is often computed from the acoustic log-likelihood of the utterance (greater probability means higher confidence), but prosodic features can also be used in confidence prediction. For example utterances preceded by longer pauses, or with large F0 excursions, or longer durations are likely to be misrecognized (Litman et al., 2000).

**Error cost:** Confirmation is more important if an error would be costly. Thus explicit confirmation is common before actually booking a flight or moving money in an account (Kamm, 1994; Cohen et al., 2004).

A system can also choose to **reject** an utterance when the ASR confidence is so low, or the best interpretation is so semantically ill-formed, that the system can be relatively sure that the user's input was not recognized at all. Systems thus might have a three-tiered level of confidence; below a certain confidence threshold, an utterance is rejected. Above the threshold, it is explicitly confirmed. If the confidence is even higher, the utterance is implicitly confirmed.

Instead of rejecting or confirming entire utterances, it would be nice to be able to clarify only the parts of the utterance that the system didn't understand. If a system can assign confidence at a more fine-grained level than the utterance, it can clarify such individual elements via **clarification subdialogues**.

CLARIFICATION  
SUBDIALOGUES

Much of the recent work on generating dialogue acts has been within the Markov Decision Process framework, which we therefore turn to next.

## 24.6 MARKOV DECISION PROCESS ARCHITECTURE

One of the fundamental insights of the information-state approach to dialogue architecture is that the choice of conversational actions is dynamically dependent on the current information state. The previous section discussed how dialogue systems could change confirmation and rejection strategies based on context. For example if the ASR or NLU confidence is low, we might choose to do explicit confirmation. If confidence is high, we might choose implicit confirmation, or even decide not to confirm at all. Using a dynamic strategy lets us choose the action which maximizes dialogue success, while minimizing costs. This idea of changing the actions of a dialogue system based on

## MARKOV DECISION PROCESS

optimizing some kinds of rewards or costs is the fundamental intuition behind modeling dialogue as a **Markov decision process**. This model extends the information-state model by adding a probabilistic way of deciding on the proper actions given the current state.

## MDP

A Markov decision process or **MDP** is characterized by a set of **states**  $S$  an agent can be in, a set of **actions**  $A$  the agent can take, and a **reward**  $r(a,s)$  that the agent receives for taking an action in a state. Given these factors, we can compute a **policy**  $\pi$  which specifies which action  $a$  the agent should take when in a given state  $s$ , so as to receive the best reward. To understand each of these components, we'll need to look at a tutorial example in which the state space is extremely reduced. Thus we'll return to the simple frame-and-slot world, looking at a pedagogical MDP implementation taken from Levin et al. (2000). Their tutorial example is a "Day-and-Month" dialogue system, whose goal is to get correct values of day and month for a two-slot frame via the shortest possible interaction with the user.

In principle, a state of an MDP could include any possible information about the dialogue, such as the complete dialogue history so far. Using such a rich model of state would make the number of possible states extraordinarily large. So a model of state is usually chosen which encodes a much more limited set of information, such as the values of the slots in the current frame, the most recent question asked to the user, the users most recent answer, the ASR confidence, and so on. For the Day-and-Month example let's represent the state of the system as the values of the two slots *day* and *month*. If we assume a special initial state  $s_i$  and final state  $s_f$ , there are a total of 411 states (366 states with a day and month (counting leap year), 12 states with a month but no day ( $d=0, m=1,2,\dots,12$ ), and 31 states with a day but no month ( $m=0, d=1,2,\dots,31$ )).

Actions of a MDP dialogue system might include generating particular speech acts, or performing a database query to find out information. For the Day-and-Month example, Levin et al. (2000) propose the following actions:

- $a_d$ : a question asking for the day
- $a_m$ : a question asking for the month
- $a_{dm}$ : a question asking for both the day and the month
- $a_f$ : a final action submitting the form and terminating the dialogue


Since the goal of the system is to get the correct answer with the shortest interaction, one possible reward function for the system would integrate three terms:

$$(24.27) \quad R = -(w_i n_i + w_e n_e + w_f n_f)$$

The term  $n_i$  is the number of interactions with the user,  $n_e$  is the number of errors,  $n_f$  is the number of slots which are filled (0, 1, or 2), and the  $w$ s are weights.

Finally, a dialogue policy  $\pi$  specifies which actions to apply in which state. Consider two possible policies: (1) asking for day and month separately, and (2) asking for them together. These might generate the two dialogues shown in Fig. 24.22.

In policy 1, the action specified for the no-date/no-month state is to ask for a day, while the action specified for any of the 31 states where we have a day but not a month is to ask for a month. In policy 2, the action specified for the no-date/no-month state is to ask an open-ended question (*Which date*) to get both a day and a month. The two policies have different advantages; an open prompt can lead to shorter dialogues but



is likely to cause more errors, while a directive prompt is slower but less error-prone. Thus the optimal policy depends on the values of the weights  $w$ , and also on the error rates of the ASR component. Let's call  $p_d$  the probability of the recognizer making an error interpreting a month or a day value after a directive prompt. The (presumably higher) probability of error interpreting a month or day value after an open prompt we'll call  $p_o$ . The reward for the first dialogue in Fig. 24.22 is thus  $-3 \times w_i + 2 \times p_d \times w_e$ . The reward for the second dialogue in Fig. 24.22 is  $-2 \times w_i + 2 \times p_o \times w_e$ . The directive prompt policy, policy 1, is thus better than policy 2 when the improved error rate justifies the longer interaction, i.e., when  $p_d - p_o > \frac{w_i}{2w_e}$ .

In the example we've seen so far, there were only two possible actions, and hence only a tiny number of possible policies. In general, the number of possible actions, states, and policies is quite large, and so the problem of finding the optimal policy  $\pi^*$  is much harder.

Markov decision theory together with classical reinforcement learning gives us a way to think about this problem. First, generalizing from Fig. 24.22, we can think of any particular dialogue as a trajectory in state space:

(24.28) 
$$s_1 \rightarrow_{a_1, r_1} s_2 \rightarrow_{a_2, r_2} s_3 \rightarrow_{a_3, r_3} \dots$$

DISCOUNTED REWARDS

The best policy  $\pi^*$  is the one with the greatest expected reward over all trajectories. What is the expected reward for a given state sequence? The most common way to assign utilities or rewards to sequences is to use **discounted rewards**. Here we compute the expected cumulative reward  $Q$  of a sequence as a discounted sum of the utilities of the individual states:

(24.29) 
$$Q([s_0, a_0, s_1, a_1, s_2, a_2 \dots]) = R(s_0, a_0) + \gamma R(s_1, a_1) + \gamma^2 R(s_2, a_2) + \dots,$$

The discount factor  $\gamma$  is a number between 0 and 1. This makes the agent care more about current rewards than future rewards; the more future a reward, the more discounted its value.

Given this model, it is possible to show that the expected cumulative reward  $Q(s, a)$  for taking a particular action from a particular state is the following recursive equation called the **Bellman equation**:

BELLMAN EQUATION

$$(24.30) \quad Q(s, a) = R(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s'} P(s'|s, a) \max_{a'} Q(s', a')$$

What the Bellman equation says is that the expected cumulative reward for a given state/action pair is the immediate reward for the current state plus the expected discounted utility of all possible next states  $s'$ , weighted by the probability of moving to that state  $s'$ , and assuming once there we take the optimal action  $a'$ .

Equation (24.30) makes use of two parameters. We need a model of  $P(s'|s, a)$ , i.e. how likely a given state/action pair  $(s, a)$  is to lead to a new state  $s'$ . And we also need a good estimate of  $R(s, a)$ . If we had lots of labeled training data, we could simply compute both of these from labeled counts. For example, with labeled dialogues, we could simply count how many times we were in a given state  $s$ , and out of that how many times we took action  $a$  to get to state  $s'$ , to estimate  $P(s'|s, a)$ . Similarly, if we had a hand-labeled reward for each dialogue, we could build a model of  $R(s, a)$ .

#### VALUE ITERATION

Given these parameters, it turns out that there is an iterative algorithm for solving the Bellman equation and determining proper Q values, the **value iteration** algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Bellman, 1957). We won't present this here, but see Chapter 17 of Russell and Norvig (2002) for the details of the algorithm as well as further information on Markov Decision Processes.

How do we get enough labeled training data to set these parameters? This is especially worrisome in any real problem, where the number of states  $s$  is extremely large. Two methods have been applied in the past. The first is to carefully hand-tune the states and policies so that there are a very small number of states and policies that need to be set automatically. In this case we can build a dialogue system which explore the state space by generating random conversations. Probabilities can then be set from this corpus of conversations. The second is to build a simulated user. The user interacts with the system millions of times, and the system learns the state transition and reward probabilities from this corpus.

The first approach, using real users to set parameters in a small state space, was taken by Singh et al. (2002). They used reinforcement learning to make a small set of optimal policy decisions. Their NJFun system learned to choose actions which varied the initiative (system, user, or mixed) and the confirmation strategy (explicit or none). The state of the system was specified by values of 7 features including which slot in the frame is being worked on (1-4), the ASR confidence value (0-5), how many times a current slot question had been asked, whether a restrictive or non-restrictive grammar was used, and so on. The result of using only 7 features with a small number of attributes resulted in a small state space (62 states). Each state had only 2 possible actions (system versus user initiative when asking questions, explicit versus no confirmation when receiving answers). They ran the system with real users, creating 311 conversations. Each conversation had a very simple binary reward function; 1 if the user completed the task (finding specified museums, theater, winetasting in the New Jersey area), 0 if the user did not. The system successfully learned a good dialogue policy (roughly, start with user initiative, then back off to either mixed or system initiative when reasking for an attribute; confirm only at lower confidence values; both initiative and confirmation policies, however, are different for different attributes). They showed that their policy actually was more successful based on various objective measures than



many hand-designed policies reported in the literature.

The simulated user strategy was taken by Levin et al. (2000), in their MDP model with reinforcement learning in the ATIS task. Their simulated user was a generative stochastic model that given the system's current state and actions, produces a frame-slot representation of a user response. The parameters of the simulated user were estimated from a corpus of ATIS dialogues. The simulated user was then used to interact with the system for tens of thousands of conversations, leading to an optimal dialogue policy.

While the MDP architecture offers a powerful new way of modeling dialogue behavior, it relies on the problematic assumption that the system actually knows what state it is in. This is of course not true in a number of ways; the system never knows the true internal state of the user, and even the state in the dialogue may be obscured by speech recognition errors. Recent attempts to relax this assumption have relied on Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes, or POMDPs (sometimes pronounced 'pom-deepiez'). In a POMDP, we model the user output as an observed signal generated from yet another hidden variable. There are also problems with MDPs and POMDPs related to computational complexity and simulations which aren't reflective of true user behavior; See the end notes for references.

## 24.7 ADVANCED: PLAN-BASED DIALOGUE AGENTS

One of the earliest models of conversational agent behavior, and also one of the most sophisticated, is based on the use of AI planning techniques. For example, the Rochester TRIPS agent (Allen et al., 2001) simulates helping with emergency management, planning where and how to supply ambulances or personnel in a simulated emergency situation. The same planning algorithms that reason how to get an ambulance from point A to point B can be applied to conversation as well. Since communication and conversation are just special cases of rational action in the world, these actions can be planned like any other. So an agent seeking to find out some information can come up with the plan of asking the interlocutor for the information. An agent hearing an utterance can interpret a speech act by running the planner 'in reverse', using inference rules to infer what plan the interlocutor might have had to cause them to say what they said.

Using plans to generate and interpret sentences in this way require that the planner have good models of its **beliefs**, **desires**, and **intentions** (BDI), as well as those of the interlocutor. Plan-based models of dialogue are thus often referred to as **BDI** models. BDI models of dialogue were first introduced by Allen, Cohen, Perrault, and their colleagues and students in a number of influential papers showing how speech acts could be generated (Cohen and Perrault, 1979), and interpreted (Perrault and Allen, 1980; Allen and Perrault, 1980). At the same time, Wilensky (1983) introduced plan-based models of understanding as part of the task of interpreting stories. In another related line of research, Grosz and her colleagues and students showed how using similar notions of intention and plans allowed ideas of discourse structure and coherence to be applied to dialogue.

### 24.7.1 Plan-Inferential Interpretation and Production

Let's first sketch out the ideas of plan-based comprehension and production. How might a plan-based agent act as the human travel agent to understand sentence  $C_2$  in the dialogue repeated below?

$C_1$ : I need to travel in May.

$A_1$ : And, what day in May did you want to travel?

$C_2$ : OK uh I need to be there for a meeting that's from the 12th to the 15th.

The Gricean principle of Relevance can be used to infer that the client's meeting is relevant to the flight booking. The system may know that one precondition for having a meeting (at least before web conferencing) is being at the place where the meeting is in. One way of being at a place is flying there, and booking a flight is a precondition for flying there. The system can follow this chain of inference, abducting that user wants to fly on a date before the 12th.

Next, consider how our plan-based agent could act as the human travel agent to produce sentence  $A_1$  in the dialogue above. The planning agent would reason that in order to help a client book a flight it must know enough information about the flight to book it. It reasons that knowing the month (May) is insufficient information to specify a departure or return date. The simplest way to find out the needed date information is to ask the client.

In the rest of this section, we'll flesh out the sketchy outlines of planning for understanding and generation using Perrault and Allen's formal definitions of belief and desire in the predicate calculus. Reasoning about belief is done with a number of axiom schemas inspired by Hintikka (1969). We'll represent " $S$  believes the proposition  $P$ " as the two-place predicate  $B(S, P)$ , with axiom schemas such as  $B(A, P) \wedge B(A, Q) \Rightarrow B(A, P \wedge Q)$ . Knowledge is defined as "true belief";  $S$  knows that  $P$  will be represented as  $KNOW(S, P)$ , defined as  $KNOW(S, P) \equiv P \wedge B(S, P)$ .

The theory of desire relies on the predicate WANT. If an agent  $S$  wants  $P$  to be true, we say  $WANT(S, P)$ , or  $W(S, P)$  for short.  $P$  can be a state or the execution of some action. Thus if ACT is the name of an action,  $W(S, ACT(H))$  means that  $S$  wants  $H$  to do ACT. The logic of WANT relies on its own set of axiom schemas just like the logic of belief.

The BDI models also require an axiomatization of actions and planning; the simplest of these is based on a set of **action schemas** based on the simple AI planning model STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971). Each action schema has a set of parameters with *constraints* about the type of each variable, and three parts:

- *Preconditions*: Conditions that must already be true to perform the action.
- *Effects*: Conditions that become true as a result of performing the action.
- *Body*: A set of partially ordered goal states that must be achieved in performing the action.

In the travel domain, for example, the action of agent  $A$  booking flight  $F1$  for client  $C$  might have the following simplified definition:

**BOOK-FLIGHT(A,C,F):**

Constraints: Agent(A)  $\wedge$  Flight(F)  $\wedge$  Client(C)  
 Precondition: Know(A,depart-date(F))  $\wedge$  Know(A,depart-time(F))  
 $\wedge$  Know(A,origin(F))  $\wedge$  Know(A,flight-type(F))  
 $\wedge$  Know(A,destination(F))  $\wedge$  Has-Seats(F)  $\wedge$   
 $W(C,(BOOK(A,C,F))) \wedge \dots$   
 Effect: Flight-Booked(A,C,F)  
 Body: Make-Reservation(A,F,C)

This same kind of STRIPS action specification can be used for speech acts. INFORM is the speech act of informing the hearer of some proposition, based on Grice's (1957) idea that a speaker informs the hearer of something merely by causing the hearer to believe that the speaker wants them to know something:

**INFORM(S,H,P):**

Constraints: Speaker(S)  $\wedge$  Hearer(H)  $\wedge$  Proposition(P)  
 Precondition: Know(S,P)  $\wedge$  W(S, INFORM(S, H, P))  
 Effect: Know(H,P)  
 Body: B(H,W(S,Know(H,P)))

REQUEST is the directive speech act for requesting the hearer to perform some action:

**REQUEST(S,H,ACT):**

Constraints: Speaker(S)  $\wedge$  Hearer(H)  $\wedge$  ACT(A)  $\wedge$  H is agent of ACT  
 Precondition: W(S,ACT(H))  
 Effect: W(H,ACT(H))  
 Body: B(H,W(S,ACT(H)))

Let's now see how a plan-based dialogue system might interpret the sentence:

C<sub>2</sub>: I need to be there for a meeting that's from the 12th to the 15th.

We'll assume the system has the BOOK-FLIGHT plan mentioned above. In addition, we'll need knowledge about meetings and getting to them, in the form of the MEETING, FLY-TO, and TAKE-FLIGHT plans, sketched broadly below:

**MEETING(P,L,T1,T2):**

Constraints: Person(P)  $\wedge$  Location (L)  $\wedge$  Time (T1)  $\wedge$  Time (T2)  $\wedge$  Time (TA)  
 Precondition: At (P, L, TA)  
 Before (TA, T1)  
 Body: ...

**FLY-TO(P, L, T):**

Constraints: Person(P)  $\wedge$  Location (L)  $\wedge$  Time (T)  
 Effect: At (P, L, T)  
 Body: TAKE-FLIGHT(P, L, T)

**TAKE-FLIGHT(P, L, T):**

Constraints:  $\text{Person}(P) \wedge \text{Location}(L) \wedge \text{Time}(T) \wedge \text{Flight}(F) \wedge \text{Agent}(A)$

Precondition:  $\text{BOOK-FLIGHT}(A, P, F)$

Destination-Time(F) = T

Destination-Location(F) = L

Body: ...

Now let's assume that an NLU module returns a semantics for the client's utterance which (among other things) includes the following semantic content:

**MEETING (P, ?L, T1, T2)**

Constraints:  $P = \text{Client} \wedge T1 = \text{May } 12 \wedge T2 = \text{May } 15$

Our plan-based system now has two plans established, one MEETING plan from this utterance, and one BOOK-FLIGHT plan from the previous utterance. The system implicitly uses the Gricean Relevance intuition to try to connect them. Since BOOK-FLIGHT is a precondition for TAKE-FLIGHT, the system may hypothesize (infer) that the user is planning a TAKE-FLIGHT. Since TAKE-FLIGHT is in the body of FLY-TO, the system further infers a FLY-TO plan. Finally, since the effect of FLY-TO is a precondition of the MEETING, the system can unify each of the people, locations, and times of all of these plans. The result will be that the system knows that the client wants to arrive at the destination before May 12th.

Let's turn to the details of our second example:

C<sub>1</sub>: I need to travel in May.

A<sub>1</sub>: And, what day in May did you want to travel?

How does a plan-based agent know to ask question A<sub>1</sub>? This knowledge comes from the BOOK-FLIGHT plan, whose preconditions were that the agent know a variety of flight parameters including the departure date and time, origin and destination cities, and so forth. Utterance C<sub>1</sub> contains the origin city and partial information about the departure date; the agent has to request the rest. A plan-based agent would use an action schema like REQUEST-INFO to represent a plan for asking information questions (simplified from Cohen and Perrault (1979)):

**REQUEST-INFO(A,C,I):**

Constraints:  $\text{Agent}(A) \wedge \text{Client}(C)$

Precondition:  $\text{Know}(C,I)$

Effect:  $\text{Know}(A,I)$

Body:  $B(C,W(A,\text{Know}(A,I)))$

Because the effects of REQUEST-INFO match each precondition of BOOK-FLIGHT, the agent can use REQUEST-INFO to achieve the missing information.

**24.7.2 The Intentional Structure of Dialogue**

In Sec. ?? we introduced the idea that the segments of a discourse are related by **coherence relations** like **Explanation** or **Elaboration** which describe the **informational** relation between discourse segments. The BDI approach to utterance interpretation gives

rise to another view of coherence which is particularly relevant for dialogue, the **intentional** approach (Grosz and Sidner, 1986). According to this approach, what makes a dialogue coherent is its **intentional structure**, the plan-based intentions of the speaker underlying each utterance.

INTENTIONAL  
STRUCTURE

These intentions are instantiated in the model by assuming that each discourse has an underlying purpose held by the person who initiates it, called the **discourse purpose** (DP). Each discourse segment within the discourse has a corresponding purpose, a **discourse segment purpose** (DSP), which has a role in achieving the overall DP. Possible DPs/DSPs include intending that some agent intend to perform some physical task, or that some agent believe some fact.

DISCOURSE  
PURPOSE  
DISCOURSE  
SEGMENT PURPOSE

As opposed to the larger sets of coherence relations used in informational accounts of coherence, Grosz and Sidner propose only two such relations: **dominance** and **satisfaction-precedence**. DSP<sub>1</sub> dominates DSP<sub>2</sub> if satisfying DSP<sub>2</sub> is intended to provide part of the satisfaction of DSP<sub>1</sub>. DSP<sub>1</sub> satisfaction-precedes DSP<sub>2</sub> if DSP<sub>1</sub> must be satisfied before DSP<sub>2</sub>.

<p>C<sub>1</sub>: I need to travel in May.  A<sub>1</sub>: And, what day in May did you want to travel?  C<sub>2</sub>: OK uh I need to be there for a meeting that's from the 12th to the 15th.  A<sub>2</sub>: And you're flying into what city?  C<sub>3</sub>: Seattle.  A<sub>3</sub>: And what time would you like to leave Pittsburgh?  C<sub>4</sub>: Uh hmm I don't think there's many options for non-stop.  A<sub>4</sub>: Right. There's three non-stops today.  C<sub>5</sub>: What are they?  A<sub>5</sub>: The first one departs PGH at 10:00am arrives Seattle at 12:05 their time. The second flight departs PGH at 5:55pm, arrives Seattle at 8pm. And the last flight departs PGH at 8:15pm arrives Seattle at 10:28pm.  C<sub>6</sub>: OK I'll take the 5ish flight on the night before on the 11th.  A<sub>6</sub>: On the 11th? OK. Departing at 5:55pm arrives Seattle at 8pm, U.S. Air flight 115.  C<sub>7</sub>: OK.</p>
---

**Figure 24.23** A fragment from a telephone conversation between a client (C) and a travel agent (A) (repeated from Fig. 24.4).

Consider the dialogue between a client (C) and a travel agent (A) that we saw earlier, repeated here in Fig. 24.23. Collaboratively, the caller and agent successfully identify a flight that suits the caller's needs. Achieving this joint goal requires that a top-level discourse intention be satisfied, listed as I1 below, in addition to several intermediate intentions that contributed to the satisfaction of I1, listed as I2-I5:

- I1: (Intend C (Intend A (A find a flight for C)))
- I2: (Intend A (Intend C (Tell C A departure date)))
- I3: (Intend A (Intend C (Tell C A destination city)))
- I4: (Intend A (Intend C (Tell C A departure time)))

I5: (Intend C (Intend A (A find a nonstop flight for C)))


Intentions I2–I5 are all subordinate to intention I1, as they were all adopted to meet preconditions for achieving intention I1. This is reflected in the dominance relationships below:

I1 dominates I2  $\wedge$  I1 dominates I3  $\wedge$  I1 dominates I4  $\wedge$  I1 dominates I5

Furthermore, intentions I2 and I3 needed to be satisfied before intention I5, since the agent needed to know the departure date and destination in order to start listing nonstop flights. This is reflected in the satisfaction-precedence relationships below:

I2 satisfaction-precedes I5  $\wedge$  I3 satisfaction-precedes I5

The dominance relations give rise to the discourse structure depicted in Figure 24.24. Each discourse segment is numbered in correspondence with the intention number that serves as its DP/DSP.



Intentions and their relationships give rise to a coherent discourse based on their role in the overall *plan* that the caller is inferred to have. We assume that the caller and agent have the plan BOOK-FLIGHT described on page 43. This plan requires that the agent know the departure time and date and so on. As we discussed above, the agent can use the REQUEST-INFO action scheme from page 44 to ask the user for this information.

#### SUBDIALOGUES

Subsidiary discourse segments are also called **subdialogues**; DS2 and DS3 in particular are **information-sharing** (Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1998) **knowledge precondition** subdialogues (Lochbaum et al., 1990; Lochbaum, 1998), since they are initiated by the agent to help satisfy preconditions of a higher-level goal.

Algorithms for inferring intentional structure in dialogue work similarly to algorithms for inferring dialogue acts, either employing the BDI model (e.g., Litman, 1985; Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Litman and Allen, 1987; Carberry, 1990; Passonneau and Litman, 1993; Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1998), or machine learning architectures based on cue phrases (Reichman, 1985; Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Hirschberg and Litman, 1993), prosody (Hirschberg and Pierrehumbert, 1986; Grosz and Hirschberg, 1992; Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg, 1990; Hirschberg and Nakatani, 1996), and other cues.

## 24.8 SUMMARY

**Conversational agents** are a crucial speech and language processing application that are already widely used commercially. Research on these agents relies crucially on an

understanding of human dialogue or conversational practices.

- Dialogue systems generally have 5 components: speech recognition, natural language understanding, dialogue management, natural language generation, and speech synthesis. They may also have a task manager specific to the task domain.
- Dialogue architectures for conversational agents include finite-state systems, **frame-based** production systems, and advanced systems such as information-state, Markov Decision Processes, and **BDI (belief-desire-intention)** models.
- Turn-taking, grounding, conversational structure, implicature, and initiative are crucial human dialogue phenomena that must also be dealt with in conversational agents.
- Speaking in dialogue is a kind of action; these acts are referred to as speech acts or **dialogue acts**. Models exist for generating and interpreting these acts.

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL NOTES

Early work on speech and language processing had very little emphasis on the study of dialogue. The dialogue manager for the simulation of the paranoid agent PARRY (Colby et al., 1971), was a little more complex. Like ELIZA, it was based on a production system, but where ELIZA's rules were based only on the words in the user's previous sentence, PARRY's rules also rely on global variables indicating its emotional state. Furthermore, PARRY's output sometimes makes use of script-like sequences of statements when the conversation turns to its delusions. For example, if PARRY's **anger** variable is high, he will choose from a set of "hostile" outputs. If the input mentions his delusion topic, he will increase the value of his **fear** variable and then begin to express the sequence of statements related to his delusion.

The appearance of more sophisticated dialogue managers awaited the better understanding of human-human dialogue. Studies of the properties of human-human dialogue began to accumulate in the 1970's and 1980's. The Conversation Analysis community (Sacks et al., 1974; Jefferson, 1984; Schegloff, 1982) began to study the interactional properties of conversation. Grosz's (1977) dissertation significantly influenced the computational study of dialogue with its introduction of the study of dialogue structure, with its finding that "task-oriented dialogues have a structure that closely parallels the structure of the task being performed" (p. 27), which led to her work on intentional and attentional structure with Sidner. Lochbaum et al. (2000) is a good recent summary of the role of intentional structure in dialogue. The BDI model integrating earlier AI planning work (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971) with speech act theory (Austin, 1962; Gordon and Lakoff, 1971; Searle, 1975a) was first worked out by Cohen and Perrault (1979), showing how speech acts could be generated, and Perrault and Allen (1980) and Allen and Perrault (1980), applying the approach to speech-act interpretation. Simultaneous work on a plan-based model of understanding was developed by Wilensky (1983) in the Schankian tradition.

Probabilistic models of dialogue act interpretation were informed by linguistic work which focused on the discourse meaning of prosody (Sag and Liberman, 1975; Pierrehumbert, 1980), by Conversation Analysis work on microgrammar (e.g. Goodwin, 1996), by work such as Hinkelman and Allen (1989), who showed how lexical and phrasal cues could be integrated into the BDI model, and then worked out at a number of speech and dialogue labs in the 1990's (Waibel, 1988; Daly and Zue, 1992; Kompe et al., 1993; Nagata and Morimoto, 1994; Woszczyna and Waibel, 1994; Reithinger et al., 1996; Kita et al., 1996; Warnke et al., 1997; Chu-Carroll, 1998; Stolcke et al., 1998; Taylor et al., 1998; Stolcke et al., 2000).

Modern dialogue systems drew on research at many different labs in the 1980's and 1990's. Models of dialogue as collaborative behavior were introduced in the late 1980's and 1990's, including the ideas of common ground (Clark and Marshall, 1981), reference as a collaborative process (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), and models of **joint intentions** (Levesque et al., 1990), and **shared plans** (Grosz and Sidner, 1980). Related to this area is the study of **initiative** in dialogue, studying how the dialogue control shifts between participants (Walker and Whittaker, 1990; Smith and Gordon, 1997; Chu-Carroll and Brown, 1997).

A wide body of dialogue research came out of AT&T and Bell Laboratories around the turn of the century, including much of the early work on MDP dialogue systems as well as fundamental work on cue-phrases, prosody, and rejection and confirmation. Work on dialogue acts and dialogue moves drew from a number of sources, including HCRC's Map Task (Carletta et al., 1997b), and the work of James Allen and his colleagues and students, for example Hinkelman and Allen (1989), showing how lexical and phrasal cues could be integrated into the BDI model of speech acts, and Traum (2000), Traum and Hinkelman (1992), and from Sadek (1991).

Much recent academic work in dialogue focuses on multimodal applications (Johnston et al., 2007; Niekrasz and Purver, 2006, *inter alia*), on the information-state model (Traum and Larsson, 2003, 2000) or on reinforcement learning architectures including POMDPs (Roy et al., 2000; Young, 2002; Lemon et al., 2006; Williams and Young, 2005, 2000). Work in progress on MDPs and POMDPs focuses on computational complexity (they currently can only be run on quite small domains with limited numbers of slots), and on improving simulations to make them more reflective of true user behavior. Alternative algorithms include SMDPs (Cuayáhuítl et al., 2007). See Russell and Norvig (2002) and Sutton and Barto (1998) for a general introduction to reinforcement learning.

Recent years have seen the widespread commercial use of dialogue systems, often based on VoiceXML. Some more sophisticated systems have also seen deployment. For example **Clarissa**, the first spoken dialogue system used in space, is a speech-enabled procedure navigator that was used by astronauts on the International Space Station (Rayner and Hockey, 2004; Aist et al., 2002). Much research focuses on more mundane in-vehicle applications in cars Weng et al. (2006, *inter alia*). Among the important technical challenges in embedding these dialogue systems in real applications are good techniques for endpointing (deciding if the speaker is done talking) (Ferrer et al., 2003) and for noise robustness.

Good surveys on dialogue systems include Harris (2005), Cohen et al. (2004), McTear (2002, 2004), Sadek and De Mori (1998), and the dialogue chapter in Allen



(1995).

## EXERCISES

- 24.1** List the dialogue act misinterpretations in the *Who's On First* routine at the beginning of the chapter.
- 24.2** Write a finite-state automaton for a dialogue manager for checking your bank balance and withdrawing money at an automated teller machine.
- 24.3** Dispreferred responses (for example turning down a request) are usually signaled by surface cues, such as significant silence. Try to notice the next time you or someone else utters a dispreferred response, and write down the utterance. What are some other cues in the response that a system might use to detect a dispreferred response? Consider non-verbal cues like eye-gaze and body gestures.
- 24.4** When asked a question to which they aren't sure they know the answer, people display their lack of confidence via cues that resemble other dispreferred responses. Try to notice some unsure answers to questions. What are some of the cues? If you have trouble doing this, read Smith and Clark (1993) and listen specifically for the cues they mention.
- 24.5** Build a VoiceXML dialogue system for giving the current time around the world. The system should ask the user for a city and a time format (24 hour, etc) and should return the current time, properly dealing with time zones.
- 24.6** Implement a small air-travel help system based on text input. Your system should get constraints from the user about a particular flight that they want to take, expressed in natural language, and display possible flights on a screen. Make simplifying assumptions. You may build in a simple flight database or you may use a flight information system on the web as your backend.
- 24.7** Augment your previous system to work with speech input via VoiceXML. (or alternatively, describe the user interface changes you would have to make for it to work via speech over the phone). What were the major differences?
- 24.8** Design a simple dialogue system for checking your email over the telephone. Implement in VoiceXML.
- 24.9** Test your email-reading system on some potential users. Choose some of the metrics described in Sec. 24.4.2 and evaluate your system.

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